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HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Disappointing Record
The international human rights system enters the twenty-first century facing
a profound anomaly. Despite remarkable normative and institutional
developments since the system's inception,' the world remains mired in
widespread violations of human dignity. Genocidal episodes have repeatedly
scarred the consciousness of humankind since World War ll.2 Floods of
refugees and simmering ethnic conflicts continually challenge the international
community's capacity to respond,3 and grotesque forms of physical abuse, such
as torture and summary execution, remain commonplace Despite a promising
It is beyond controversy that the international system has developed a legal regime once
thought improbable for the protection of human rights. In addition to an extensive network of
widely adopted treaties covering nearly all aspects of human life, the international system boasts
an elaborate institutional framework for protecting human rights. See generally HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS (2d ed. 2000).
2 See, e.g., U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Summary Record of the Second Part ofthe 1665th Meeting, Dialogue with Juan
Mendez, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR. 1665/Add. 1
(Aug. 20, 2004) (Committee Member Shahi observing that "[r]egrettably, the United Nations
itself had been ineffective in preventing genocide. There had been at least fifty-five genocides
since the Organization's founding, in which approximately 75 million people had died."). See
also Gregory H. Stanton, Genocides, Politicides, and Other Mass Murder Since 1945, With
Stages in 2005, GENOCIDE WATCH, http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocidetable2005.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2006) (providing a table outlining the mass murder status and history of
countries throughout the world). The persistence of genocidal episodes prompted Michael
Scharf's wry observation that: "[T]he pledge of 'never again' quickly became the reality of
'again and again' ...." Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the
First International War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 861 (1997).
' The most recent example involves the crisis in Darfur, Sudan. See U.N. High Comm'r on
Human Rights, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N.
Secretary-General (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/darfurreport.
doc; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Report of the UN. High Comm.for Human Rights,
Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/3 (May
7, 2004) (reporting a "pattern of massive and gross human rights violations"); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED, ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN
WESTERN SUDAN, Vol. 16, No. 6(a) (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan
0504.
4 Amnesty International believes that as many as 150 governments continue to practice
torture. See Amnesty International, Ask Amnesty, http://www.amnestyusa.org/askamnesty/
torture200112.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006). Recent events at the Abu Ghraib Prison during
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trend toward democratic governance around the world, basic civil liberties for
countless millions remain only an empty promise.' Most disheartening of all,
the two greatest enemies of human dignity, armed conflict and poverty,
relentlessly plague the vast majority of humankind.6 It seems undeniable that
the elaborate international human rights edifice, now often rhetorically central
in international relations, has made and can continue to make some difference.
Yet, it is equally undeniable that the system has yet to fulfill its promises or
significantly reduce violations of human rights worldwide.7
the war in Iraq reflect a cold reality for Americans that torture is neither a relic of the dark past
nor something perpetrated solely by barbaric foreign despots. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: HUMAN DIGNITY DENIED, TORTURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
"WAR ON TERROR," AMR/51/145/2004 (Oct. 27, 2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/index/engamr511452004; Editorial, Legalizing Torture, WASH. POST, June 9, 2004, at
A20; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004.
1 See, e.g., WorldAudit.org, Freedom House Annual Survey, http://www.worldaudit.org/
civillibs.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) (rating freedom of human rights worldwide).
6 See Armed Conflict Timeline Index 1800-1999, available at http://www.onwar.com/aced/
chrono/index.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) (listing more than seventy events during the 1990s
that could fairly be described as "armed conflict"); see also Ploughshares Project, Armed
Conflicts Report 2006, available at http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Title
PageRev.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (including links to reports on current armed conflicts,
children and armed conflict, and world hunger and armed conflict); Uppsala Conflict Database,
Uppsala University (Sweden), available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php (last visited
Nov. 15,2006) (providing a detailed database concerning 121 armed conflicts between 1989 and
2005). The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization and World Health Organization estimate
that 25,000 people die every day from hunger and the effects of poverty, while nearly 800
million people are malnourished or hungry. United Nations World Food Programme, Hunger
Facts, http://www.wfp.org/aboutwpf/facts/hunger facts.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). The
Ploughshares Project also provides a map detailing the correlation between armed conflict and
high percentages of under-nourished populations. See World Hunger and Armed Conflict,
http://www.ploughshares.ca/imagesarticles/ACR02/hungermap.02.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2006).
' There is scant empirical evidence regarding whether the international human rights system
is effectively achieving its objectives. Oona Hathaway's recent work is a rare example of
empirically oriented legal research in human rights. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (examining the correlations between
ratification of human rights treaties and violations); Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of
Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821 (2003) (examining whether the cost of commitment to
international human rights treaties influences countries' decisions to join them); see also Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring The Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L.
171 (2003) (critiquing the premises and design of Hathaway's study); Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towarda TheoryofEffectiveSupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J.
273, 345 (1997) (analyzing state compliance with the decisions of human rights institutions);
Randall Peerenboom, Show Me The Money: The Dominance of Wealth in Determining Rights
[Vol. 35:1
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B. Designed For Failure
The apparent inability of the human rights system to deliver effectively on
its lofty and noble promises is not, in many ways, surprising. It is, after all, a
system designed with significantly limited enforcement capacity. Both
Pollyannaish and cynical, the international system heavily relies upon the
dubious premise that governments will faithfully implement international
human rights standards within their own domestic systems and provide
adequate domestic remedies to redress violations! This reliance on voluntary
compliance is theoretically bolstered by a network of international mechanisms
and institutions that are, in reality, anemic at best. Although not without
exceptions,9 most international human rights institutions are generally limited
to monitoring state compliance and promoting adherence to underdeveloped
international standards through dialogue, condemnation, and moral suasion.
Most of these institutions suffer from limited or ambiguous decision-making
authority and lack effective, independent enforcement mechanisms.
0
Thus constrained, the international system has generally failed to check the
abuse of repressive governments and meaningfully deliver the promise of
human rights to those most in need of protection. In essence, the international
system's approach to enforcement and implementation of human rights has
proven unrealistic in a world characterized by oppression, autocratic
governments, poverty, and armed conflict. Although there is no clear
consensus regarding what enforcement of international human rights should
look like, few would disagree that existing enforcement mechanisms remain
the weakest link in the international human rights system.
Performance in Asia, 15 DuKEJ.COMP.&INT'LL. 75 (2004) (surveying and discussing attempts
to quantify human rights performance with an emphasis on Asia). Improvements in human rights
conditions are difficult to quantify and causal relationships nearly impossible to demonstrate
convincingly given the number and elusive nature of relevant variables.
See infra notes 33-40, 45-46 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 119-45 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text. It is important to recognize that limitations
on the decision-making authority of international institutions may serve far more important and
less cynical purposes than preserving sovereign power. In the context of finctioning
democracies, such limitations may reflect appropriate concessions to competing interests such
as preserving domestic democratic choice, local autonomy, and self-governance. See generally
Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of International
Decision-Making, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1 (2003) (examining the tension between international
governance of human rights and domestic democracy).
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This Article considers some explanations for this enforcement gap and
suggests that traditional approaches to enforcement, while serving some
important functions, are inadequate to meet the challenge of effectively
realizing human rights in the twenty-first century. These inadequacies include
a variety of institutional, conceptual, and jurisprudential weaknesses, some of
which are inherent in the system's current design. The most important of these
interrelated weaknesses include: (1) failure to develop a coherent overall
structure with institutions whose attributes are likely to promote the legitimacy
of international decision-making and encourage state respect; (2) refusal to
make important distinctions among rights with regard to enforcement methods;
(3) failure to adequately pursue individual versus governmental accountability
for violations; and (4) inability to develop adequate economic, political, and
social incentives that might render voluntary state compliance a more realistic
possibility.
C. Rethinking Human Rights Enforcement: Potential New Paradigms
Reform of existing institutions is essential, and alternative approaches to
enforcement should be developed. It is time to rethink the approach and role
of international institutions regarding enforcement of human rights. Some
important lessons can be drawn from several evolving alternative approaches
to human rights enforcement and the success of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR)." In this regard, there are three developing enforcement
alternatives that are particularly important by virtue of their shared emphasis
on individual accountability for a fairly narrow range of egregious, universally
understood human rights violations.'2 The first two involve the increased use
of "foreign" domestic legal processes, 3 both civil and criminal, to seek
individual accountability against human rights abusers outside of their state of
origin. These enforcement approaches might be described as the Filartiga14
and Pinochet"5 paradigms, based upon the seminal cases that exemplify them.
1 See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part III.A-C.
13 "Foreign," in this sense, means reliance on domestic processes outside of the country in
which the alleged violations occurred.
'4 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the Alien Tort Statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), authorized federal court jurisdiction over claims brought by a
Paraguayan national against Paraguayan public officials for torture that took place in Paraguay).
See infra notes 92, 106-18 and accompanying text.
"5 Bow St. Metro. StipendaryMagistrateExpartePinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.
[Vol. 35:1
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The third enforcement alternative, of which the Pinochet paradigm is arguably
also a part, is the international criminalization of human rights violations.' 6 A
critical part of this trend is the evolution of meaningful international criminal
law processes, such as those being developed by the International Criminal
Court and ad hoc war crimes tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda. 7
Although these developing alternatives are not themselves the answer to
anemic human rights enforcement and each presents its own problems, 8 their
shared characteristics provide important reform insights.' 9 In particular, these
alternative approaches suggest an important departure from traditional
institutional frameworks by recognizing critical distinctions among rights with
regards to appropriate enforcement methodologies."z Each focuses upon
individual accountability."' Each takes advantage of forums with clearly
established decision-making authority and effective enforcement mechanisms
that are external, yet jurisdictionally constrained, to the violating state. Each
focuses on a fairly narrow range of well-defined and egregious human rights
violations. These three characteristics sharply distinguish these enforcement
alternatives from more traditional approaches to human rights enforcement.
1999). See infra note 91 and accompanying text; infra Part IIlA.
16 See infra note 93 and accompanying text; infra Part III.C.
'7 See infra Part III.C.
IS Increased acceptance of alternative methodologies will, in its own right, improve human
rights enforcement options for victims and increase the deterrence of wrongful behavior. See
infra Part IV.A. Some have argued, however, that applying domestic processes to foreign human
rights violations poses problems concerning foreign relations and the role of courts. These
problems might include the dangers of retaliation, political manipulation, and disruption of
foreign policy. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs oflnternational Human Rights Litigation,
2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001) (suggesting that these concerns are raised by international human
rights litigation generally); Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The
Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 433 (2002) (summarizing and
responding to such concerns). Moreover, for a variety of reasons, it is unlikely that the
alternatives will reach a significant number of defendants. See infra notes 154-57 and
accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Part IIIA-C; infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
21 Filartiga-style cases are technically not limited to individual defendants. In the United
States, for example, a foreign government may also be subjected to civil liability under the
narrow exceptions to sovereign immunity authorized by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) and (a)(7) (2000). The narrowness ofthis relatively recent exception and
other complications in suing foreign governments have caused most litigation in the United
States to focus on individual defendants.
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The most important of these characteristics is a focus on egregious
violations of largely uncontested human rights standards, such as those
commonly associated withjus cogens and universal jurisdiction. This focus
serves two related and critical purposes. First, it recognizes important
distinctions among rights in terms of enforceability, which sets the groundwork
for desperately needed improvements in the credibility and institutional
legitimacy of international decision-making. As a practical matter,
governments are more likely to create international institutions with
meaningful enforcement powers if such powers are jurisdictionally
constrained to enforce rights for which true international consensus exists.
Second, appropriate distinctions among rights may also serve to preserve
and enhance domestic democracy by reserving the resolution of controversial
and genuinely contestable human rights issues to more accountable and
democratically legitimate local institutions, subject to relatively weak
international supervision. Such distinctions reduce the potential for future,
undesirable external interference in domestic democratic choice by
international institutions that lack the credentials, accountability, and
authenticity to render democratically legitimate decision-making regarding
controversial moral issues. Correspondingly, such prudential constraints
should allow incremental improvement in the credibility and stature of existing
international human rights institutions whose effectiveness is ultimately vital
to achieving universal adherence to human rights standards.
The persistent, historical refusal of the international system to recognize
that not all rights should be implemented or enforced in the same ways has
been a mistake.22 It may well be that a relatively weak system of international
supervision on the global level is the most appropriate model for those rights
involving highly contested moral issues because that model best supports our
common interest in democratic governance and self-determination. In contrast,
strong enforcement mechanisms, including authoritative international criminal
law and regional processes, are both more feasible and appropriate for other
rights over which international consensus regarding meaning is clear, such as
torture, genocide, and other egregious violations of basic human dignity.23 In
essence, the international system must develop a more rational, nuanced, and
22 The ECHR has developed a sophisticated jurisprudence recognizing the importance of
such distinctions as appropriate to the circumstances of Europe. See Douglas Lee Donoho,
Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of
Diversity within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 391, 450-64 (2001).
23 See infra Part IV.B.
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practical approach to human rights enforcement if it hopes to fulfill the
promise of human rights in the twenty-first century.
Although an unrealistic model for international enforcement generally,24 the
success of the ECHR provides additional, related insights regarding reform of
existing international institutions.25 The Court's development of effective
institutional characteristics and a carefully crafted jurisprudence defining its
role vis-A-vis democratic member states have been critical components of its
successful enforcement record. Important lessons also may be drawn from the
Court's regional focus and reliance on independently created economic,
political, and cultural incentives to induce state compliance. The ECHR's
success in navigating the inherent tension between international enforcement
and national sovereignty has positive implications for the still uncertain and
evolving relationship between international institutions and domestic
democracy.
The following parts of this Article first provides an overview and critique
of the traditional paradigms for enforcing international human rights standards.
The purpose of this overview is to clearly identify existing enforcement
alternatives and pinpoint their fundamental weaknesses and limitations. Part
III briefly describes the developing enforcement trends identified above and
important characteristics of the ECHR that highlight lessons for reforming
other existing institutions. The remainder of the Article is devoted to sorting
out the implications of these trends and alternatives for the future of human
rights enforcement, with a particular emphasis on the evolving relationship
between international human rights and domestic democracy.
II. PREVAILING PARADIGMS: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO HUMAN
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
Accurately generalizing about human rights enforcement is not a simple
task. The international human rights system is neither unified nor static. Over
its relatively brief evolution, the system has generated a rather complicated
structure comprising numerous institutions of varied decision-making
authority, enforcement capacities, and mechanisms.26 The success of these
24 See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 145-47, 158-60 and accompanying text.
26 The international system's complexity reflects a lack of coherent overall structure and a
pressing need for reorganization and rationalization that has persisted for many years. See, e.g.,
Douglas Lee Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in Global Security Issues: A Normative and
Institutional Critique, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827, 839-50, 859-64 (1993).
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institutions' enforcement efforts, at least if measured in terms of practical
consequences, has also varied widely. Enforcement within the highly
functional European System of Human Rights, for example, hardly resembles
that of other international human rights institutions, such as those promoted by
the U.N. treaty structure or the other regional systems. Indeed, as explained
below, it is somewhat of a misnomer to describe the current work of many
international human rights institutions as involving enforcement at all.27
Complicating matters, there is considerable disagreement among
governments, scholars, and the institutions themselves over the appropriate
role and authority of many human rights bodies. Some of these basic
differences in viewpoint, prompted by lingering ambiguities over legal
mandate,28 are reflected in the subtle linguistic distinctions between words
such as "monitoring," "supervision," "implementation," and "enforcement."
To "monitor" or "supervise" may, for example, imply authority to suggest
change but not necessarily the power to bind states in any technical legal sense.
Similarly, even when human rights institutions are given technically "binding"
legal authority, states may refuse to create mechanisms by which to effectuate
implementation of their decisions. Such decisions are, in this sense, binding
yet unenforceable.
The term "enforcement" is also subject to ambiguity due to the myriad of
forms it may take and the imprecise ways in which it is commonly used.29 For
example, international institutions and governments increasingly bring
pressure to bear on a transgressing government in order to induce a change in
behavior or policy through public condemnation. Such pressure is often
27 See infra notes 32, 47-52 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
29 The dictionary definition of the word "enforce" reflects these various meanings: "1: to give
force to: STRENGTHEN 2: to urge with energy 3: CONSTRAIN, COMPEL 4: to effect or gain
by force 5: to carry out effectively (-laws)... " WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 1996). Enforcement issues are endemic to the international legal order, which is
characterized by institutions that generally lack direct mechanisms to compel compliance with
their decisions. The problems of enforcement and compliance have continued to generate a
steady stream of sophisticated academic literature. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations
Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303 (1998); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence
States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621 (2004); Andrew
T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1823 (2002);
Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law,
72 U. Cm. L. REv. 469 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory ofHuman Rights Compliance,
97 Nw. U. L. REv. 879 (2003). See generally William C. Bradford, International Legal
Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 379 (2004).
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described as enforcement although it seldom involves mandatory sanctions,
rarely induces any change in behavior, and can usually be ignored entirely
without serious consequence.3" In the discussion that follows, "enforcement"
is generally used in the more limited sense to describe authoritative
mechanisms that are designed and expected to compel direct consequences,
such as changes in governmental policy, payment of civil compensation, or
imposition of criminal penalties, under the threat of meaningful sanction.3 1
Enforcement is, of course, only one of the many ways in which state
compliance and implementation of human rights might be induced. As
described below, enforcement in this sense forms only a small part of the
existing international human rights regime.32
It is reasonably accurate to characterize the traditional model for
implementing international human rights as involving the interplay of domestic
and international authority along two related paths. The first path rests on the
30 There is no doubt that enforcement of human rights takes place in a more indirect sense
on many other levels. For example, it is not unreasonable to think of state-to-state posturing
over human rights in international relations as a form of enforcement. This is particularly true
when such posturing takes place before international institutions that may condemn a state's
human rights performance with subtle consequences for that state's economic prospects and
standing in the international community. Similarly, some states have linked, at least on paper,
their grants of foreign aid or trade benefits to certain human rights standards. See, e.g.,
Hathaway, supra note 29, at 504-05; Sorcha MacLeod, Remark, Corporate SocialResponsibility
within the European Union Framework, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 541, 542-43 (2005). This is
undoubtedly enforcement on some level since such linkages are designed to induce changes in
the human rights performance of other states.
"' This definition appears analogous to Hart's position that law, by its nature, essentially
requires the command of the sovereign, backed by meaningful sanctions compelled through the
coercive power of the state. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1961). However, the
definition is used here solely in a pragmatic fashion to provide a meaningful benchmark for
evaluating whether and how the international human rights system may generate practical
consequences from legal norms.
32 Promotional activities of international organizations, for example, potentially play an
important role in encouraging state "internalization" of rights through national implementation
of legal norms and empowerment of local populations. The literature regarding state compliance
with international law also suggests that international legal and institutional processes play a
subtle role beyond coercion in developing compliance over time. See generally Goodman &
Jinks, supra note 29 (disputing the premise that effective international legal regimes must either
coerce or persuade state actors and suggesting that regime design must account for complex
"social" factors that influence state behavior, most prominently "acculturation"); Moore, supra
note 29, at 882-99 (discussing human rights compliance as a form of "signaling" to other states
regarding, among other things, readiness and capacity for diplomatic and economic relations).
See generally Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACYAMONGNATIONS 183-94(1990)
(concept of "legitimacy" as an explanation of the "compliance pull" of international norms).
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traditional premise that initial and primary authority for implementing and
enforcing international standards lies with domestic institutions. The second
path involves the participation of international institutions, most commonly
through supervision and monitoring of state compliance.
A. Voluntary Compliance and Domestic Primacy
Under the text of most multilateral treaties, domestic institutions have
primary and original responsibility to "give effect" to international human
rights and provide an effective remedy for violations.33 This approach to
human rights enforcement, which might be described as the "domestic
primacy" path, emphasizes and relies upon voluntary government compliance.
In this regard, it is important to recognize that international law does not
require states to authorize direct enforcement of human rights obligations in
domestic institutions.34 Traditionally, states have been categorized as either
"monist" or "dualist" in this regard, depending upon whether international
obligations are automatically treated as operable domestic law or, rather, only
3" Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR],
is illustrative. It provides:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary
to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Id. The primacy of national implementation is also reflected in the ubiquitous requirement that
domestic remedies be exhausted as a prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of international
human rights institutions. See, e.g., Organization of American States, American Convention on
Human Rights art. 46(1)(a),Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into
force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]; Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional
Protocol]; see also Advisory Opinion OC- 11/90 ofAug. 10, 1990, Exceptions to the Exhaustion
of Domestic Remedies, arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 11, paras. 2, 14; Jo M. Pasqualucci, Preliminary
Objections Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Legitimate Issues and
Illegitimate Tactics, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 59-61 (1999).
14 Most international human rights treaties include an obligation to provide effective
remedies for the rights recognized in the treaty, but do not require direct incorporation of the
treaty itself. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Gen. Comment No. 31, The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (2004) (requiring "that States Parties take the necessary steps to give
effect to the Covenant rights in the domestic order").
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incorporated into domestic law through specific executive or legislative
action.35 Monist states follow a "direct" or "automatic" incorporation
approach that essentially treats international law obligations, ipsofacto, as part
of the domestic legal system enforceable like any other source of domestic law.
Such direct incorporation would arguably reflect the pinnacle of enforceability
since international standards would be directly applied and violations
remedied, at least in functioning democracies, by independent and effective
domestic institutions.36
So-called "dualist" states, in contrast, generally choose to implement
international human rights obligations solely (or primarily) through legislative
or executive intercession. Under a dualist conception, international obligations
gain the status of domestic law only when affirmatively incorporated into the
domestic system. Thus, for example, a dualist state may selectively create
domestic laws and remedies that are designed to protect certain internationally
based rights, although the originating treaty or customary principle is not itself
directly actionable.37 In essence, international legal obligations must pass
through a "domestic filter" in order to become an enforceable part of the
domestic legal order.
" See, e.g., MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-86 (4th ed. 2003).
See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception,
51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 530-31 (1999); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853, 864-66
(1987); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43,
55-56 (2004).
36 The actual enforceability of an international obligation would, even under a monist
approach, depend on additional factors. For example, two distinct and critical issues in this
regard are the precise legal status of the directly incorporated international obligation and
allocation of final authority over interpretation of the precise meaning of the obligation once
incorporated. In some states, like Germany, international law is treated, at least theoretically,
as superior to other forms of domestic law. See JANIS, supra note 35, at 85-86, 97-102, 105-09.
In the United States, an incorporated treaty (self-executing) has the constitutional status of
federal law, and therefore, trumps inconsistent state law but not subsequently enacted federal
statutes. Id. The status of customary international law, while often debated, see infra note 38,
appears to be lower than either treaties or federal law. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700, 708 (1900). Direct incorporation raises yet unanswered questions regarding the authority
of domestic versus international institutions to interpret and authoritatively apply international
standards. At least in the United States, it seems apparent that domestic institutions would assert
ultimate authority over interpretation of an incorporated international obligation. See, e.g., Brad
R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REv. 1017, 1032 (2004)
(asserting that "the treaty interpretations that prevail are those of United States courts, not
international or foreign courts...").
" See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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While useful descriptively, these distinctions fail to capture the complicated
nuances of actual state practice, which most often appears to reflect subtle
variations on the dualist conception. 3' Although there is little empirical
evidence regarding the prevalence of either approach to international human
rights obligations, it is commonly thought that dualism is far more common
than truly monist approaches.39 Under these widespread dualist approaches to
international law, the enforceability of international human rights obligations
via domestic institutions ultimately depends on the discretionary actions of
national authorities. Thus, effective domestic implementation essentially rests
upon the voluntary, discretionary actions of each government.4"
38 See MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONALLAW 100-01, 127 (4th ed. 1997); Henkin, supra
note 35, at 865 (noting that "[flew if any nations are either strictly monist or strictly dualist");
Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or
Promise?, 37 COLuM.J.TRANsNAT'LL. 281,293-309 (1999) (reviewing incorporation practices
of various Latin American states). The U.S. legal system is an excellent example of these
nuances. At least nominally, the United States Constitution appears to create a monist approach.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. In reality, however,
United States law reflects a hybrid of monist and dualist characteristics by virtue of the judicially
created doctrine of self-executing treaties and its sometimes ambiguous treatment of international
customary law. Self-executing treaties may be directly incorporated into the domestic legal
system and actionable without prior legislative authorization. However, no significant
international human rights treaty has ever been held self-executing in the United States. This is
due to, at least in part, the Senate's consistent practice of attaching a declaration of non-self-
execution to such treaties. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the
Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1557 (2003); Lori Fisler
Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-
Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 515 (1991). Customary law, in contrast, is generally
treated as an actionable part of the domestic legal system, but with a status below that of most
other forms of domestic law. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 677; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The precise legal
status of customary law, particularly whether its violation is actionable in the federal courts, is
still subject to intense debate. See generally Ehren J. Brav, Recent Development, Opening The
Courtroom Doors to Non-Citizens: Cautiously Affirming Filartigafor the Alien Tort Statute, 46
HARV. INT'LL.J. 265 (2005) (summarizing the debate over the status on customary international
law and the implications of the Sosa decision).
39 See JANIS, supra note 35, at 85-86, 97-102, 105-08.
40 One might presume that states ratify human rights treaties with a commitment to
voluntarily comply with their provisions for the good of their people. More cynical explanations
for state ratification of treaties are, sadly, more plausible. Many states undoubtedly join human
rights treaties precisely because they expect few consequences from doing so. How else can one




B. The Traditional Role of International Institutions
Most international human rights institutions have, at minimum,
responsibility to "monitor" or "supervise" the presumed national
implementation of international obligations by state parties." In this sense, the
traditional model for effectuating international rights necessarily also
implicates international authority. Thus, a second major path of human rights
enforcement involves the work of international human rights institutions and
the response of domestic legal systems to that work product. The critical
considerations in this regard involve the authority of international institutions
and mechanisms for enforcement.
Theoretically, the international side of rights enforcement could take place
under a vertical or "top-down" model in which authoritative international
human rights institutions would directly compel compliance with human rights
standards, utilizing means ranging from an "international marshal's office" to
binding economic sanctions.42 As currently situated, however, international
human rights institutions do not enjoy the capacity to directly enforce their
own decisions.43 Lacking their own enforcement powers and mechanisms,
these institutions must instead rely on the domestic enforcement capacities and
goodwill of domestic governments.
" Cf supra note 33 and accompanying text; infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text;
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 503-04, 522-35, 537-39, 556.
42 Arguments favoring "linkages" between human rights compliance and participation in
international economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank
and, World Trade Organization (WTO) are creative extensions of this basic idea. See generally
David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5 (2002); Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The
Question ofLinkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (2002); Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Justice: Linking
the Trade Linkage Debates, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 391 (1998).
4" See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999,
reprinted in WaLAMA. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONALCRIMINALCOURT
176 (2001) [hereinafter ICC Treaty]. Even international criminal law institutions such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Court (ICC) are generally forced to rely on the existing institutional enforcement
mechanisms of member states. The ICTY may indict, issue arrest warrants, prosecute, and
sentence perpetrators of crimes against humanity, and it has the imprimatur and authority of the
United Nations Security Council. Yet, it has no means of directly effectuating any of these
powers. Rather, the ICTY relies on the enforcement capacity of member states that agree to
carry out its orders and ultimately even punish those convicted. See U.N. International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY at a Glance, http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.
htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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Because of this forced reliance, the theoretical apex of enforceability for
international institutions would occur if and when states recognized
international decisions as authoritative and binding, and allowed the direct
enforcement of such decisions by domestic institutions. In essence, states
could choose to give the decisional output of human rights institutions "direct
effect" without requiring prior legislative or executive action or approval."
The reality is, however, that international law does not require that states adopt
this approach to international decision-making and few, if any, states appear
to have done so.45 For the vast majority of the international community, the
decisions of international human rights institutions are simply not treated as
binding or authoritative within the domestic legal order, even if technically
"binding" under the relevant treaty regime."
Ultimately, most governments choose to enforce international decisions, if
at all, solely through discretionary domestic legislative or executive action.
Governments have generally reserved to themselves final discretion regarding
the actual manner and method for enforcement of international institution
44 Roth, supra note 36, at 1032. Recognition of the decisions of international institutions
presents distinct issues from the question of incorporation of international obligations generally.
45 See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 429, 491-95 (2003). There are, of course, exceptions such as Costa Rica. See Holly Dawn
Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on National Courts, 28
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 317-18 (1997) (citing Annual Report of the Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 16/26, OEA/Ser.L/III.6, doc. 13 (Oct. 16, 1982) (discussing legislation ratified by
the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica on September 9, 1983, Law No. 6889)). Even within
the highly effective European system, both the European Court of Justice of the European Union
and the ECHR primarily rely on the willingness of member states to voluntarily comply with and
enforce their judgments. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 297.
46 A good example of this is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See infra note 54.
Although the Court's decisions under the American Convention's individual petitioning process
are technically binding on the state defendant, states have often simply ignored the Court,
inevitably without serious consequences. See, e.g., Constitutional Court Case (Peru), Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. E), 14 (Aug. 14, 2000); Jarmul, supra note 45, at 317-18; see also Laurence R.
Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth
Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLuM. L. REv. 1832, 1870-94
(2002) (discussing the withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Committee's jurisdiction by
three Caribbean states after adverse rulings). In contrast, virtually all parties to the European
Convention on Human Rights have acknowledged the binding nature of the ECHR's decisions.
See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 276, 295-97. National courts may, of course,
sometimes choose to follow the decisions of international tribunals as persuasive authority. See
Martinez, supra note 45, at 491-95 (describing the occasional persuasive influence of
international decision-making on national courts, including the controversial influence of
international and foreign law on the U.S. Supreme Court).
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decisions, if they enforce them at all. The key element to effective
enforcement once again lies with each government's discretionary voluntary
compliance, in this instance whether to treat the output of international human
rights bodies as authoritative and translate those decisions into action.
It is fair to say that the traditional model for human rights enforcement
involves a rather murky convergence between the two enforcement paths
described above. International human rights treaties generally place primary
responsibility for implementation and enforcement in the hands of national
authorities subject to typically ambiguous international supervisory powers.
International institutions monitor state compliance and may offer alternative
forms of redress when the national system fails. These international processes
are not generally authoritative, however, and even when technically binding
lack clear enforcement mechanisms. The effectiveness of international
remedies is, in turn, almost always dependent on the subject government's
willingness to voluntarily comply. Since international institutions lack both
authority and independent enforcement capacities, actual enforcement of
international remedies ultimately depends upon the willingness of the
perpetrators to meaningfully implement rights and comply with international
supervisory authority.
C. Institutional Failures and Ambiguous Authority
It is important to recognize initially that much of the work product of the
current international human rights system is not designed for enforcement, at
least in the sense described above. Rather, existing institutions are designed
primarily to promote human rights through disclosure, dialogue, and technical
assistance. For example, the United Nations charter-based system, which
primarily involves the politically dominated work of the Commission on
Human Rights and its various subsidiary organizations,47 does not seek to
47 See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS ch.6 (3d ed. 2001). Commonly
referred to in Western press as "discredited," the Commission on Human Rights was replaced
in March 2006, by a reformed "Human Rights Council." See G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006). The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has become
increasingly important as a spokesperson and promoter of human rights and often provides a
rapid response to developing human rights crises. The Commissioner's office has also organized
and provided a more visible and centralized face to the U.N.'s important human rights activities.
Thus far, however, the High Commissioner serves no direct enforcement role and has no overt
authority in that regard.
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enforce human rights in any direct manner.4" Institutions created under the
U.N.-sponsored network of multilateral human rights treaties are also primarily
involved in work better described as promotion than enforcement. Each of the
seven major multilateral human rights treaties sponsored by the U.N. creates
a "committee" of experts who primarily serve fact-finding and promotional
roles, reviewing state periodic reports on implementation and issuing "general
comments. '
Although there has been some effort to assert authority to bind states
pursuant to the General Comments," it would be a misnomer to refer to such
work as "enforcement," at least in the sense described above.5 The
promotional activity of human rights institutions focuses almost exclusively
on encouraging states to voluntarily change their behavior through dialogue,
confrontation, and exposure regarding alleged violations of international
standards. This activity has important benefits but cannot, at least in the short
term, be relied upon as a meaningful way to compel compliance with rights
where needed most.52
Enforcement is probably more relevant to the various individual petitioning
processes created by the regional systems and four of the major multilateral
48 With some minor exceptions, these U.N. "charter-based" institutions essentially provide
for a forum for public condemnation of friendless states guilty of a "consistent pattern of gross
violations." ECOSOC Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (May 27, 1970); ECOSOC Res.
1235, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (XLII) (1967). See also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 361.
With no authority to provide individual redress and no history of pursuing organized
consequences for violating states, the work of these U.N. charter-based institutions simply does
not involve enforcement in any meaningful sense, even though the Human Rights Commission
(recently reformed into the Human Rights Council) has the authority to refer matters to the U.N.
Security Council. Id. at 390-91.
4 See Donoho, supra note 26, at 859-62. See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1.
SO The Human Rights Committee appears to believe that General Comments issued by the
Committee are authoritative and binding on the state parties. See, e.g., Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 24(52): General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations
Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant of the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in
Relation to Declarations UnderArticle 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21 /Rev. 1/Add.6
(Nov. 11, 1994).
"' See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text. In some instances, the line between
"enforcement" and "monitoring" is somewhat blurry. For example, the Commission on Human
Rights has, since 1985, appointed a "Special Rapporteur on Torture" who has the authority to
not only conduct fact-finding, but also release "urgent appeals" to governments regarding the
treatment of specific individuals at risk of torture. See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Torture-Urgent Appeals, http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/
rapporteur/appeals.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
52 See supra note 32, infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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treaties.53  Each of the three regional human rights systems-the Inter-
American, European, and African-administer individual petitioning processes
under which human rights victims may bring their complaints, after exhaustion
of domestic remedies, before a judicial or quasi-judicial body for resolution.54
"' There are currently seven major treaty-based monitoring institutions operating under the
United Nations system. Each of these "committees" is entrusted with monitoring state
compliance with the rights recognized in their respective treaty texts. These seven major treaties
comprehensively cover civil and political rights (ICCPR, supra note 33), economic and social
rights (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]), racial discrimination
(International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]), gender
discrimination (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]),
torture (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter
CAT]), children's rights (Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Children's
Convention]), and the rights of migrant workers (International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights ofAll Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990) (entered into force July 1, 2003)).
" The three regional systems are each designed to promote adherence to comprehensive
regional human rights treaties covering a wide variety of human rights concerns. Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, amended by Protocol 11, Nov. 1, 1998 [hereinafter European Convention]; Organization
of American States, American Convention on Human Rights arts. 61, 63, 68, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978); African [Banjul]
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 24, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986). See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE chs. 7-9
(Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999). The OAS has empowered the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, which must be distinguished from the Inter-American Court offHuman Rights,
to serve monitoring functions under the OAS Charter and the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission also serves a quasi-judicial function, along with the
Inter-American Court, under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. See Cecilia
Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 439 (1990); Victor Rodriguez
Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System:
A Historical Perspective and a Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 593 (2000).
In 1998, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a protocol to the African Charter that
established an African Court on Human Rights to complement the work of the preexisting
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. The court is not yet operational and may
be merged with the African Court of Justice. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU
Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (June 9, 1998); Tim Curry, Nerina Cevra & Erin
Palmer, Updates From the Regional Human Rights Systems, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2005, at
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ICCPR, CAT, CERD, and CEDAW create similar processes that apply to any
state that has voluntarily agreed to the relevant committee's petitioning
jurisdiction.55
There are, of course, variations in the precise operation of these various
petitioning systems. In general, however, each essentially provides an
international forum before which individuals, from those states that have
specially consented, may allege that the government has violated treaty-based
human rights standards. In each system, those states consenting to the process
have authorized international decision-makers to examine such allegations and,
at minimum, present their views as to whether the government has complied
with the relevant international agreement. As described below, the most
critical question regarding these petitioning processes lies in the
authoritativeness and enforceability of the various institutions' decisions.
The European system, under the leadership of the ECHR, has undoubtedly
the most impressive enforcement record of these various individual petitioning
systems.56 Consent to the ECHR's jurisdiction is mandatory for all forty-one
23. Each provides, with variations, a petitioning process that allows individuals to seek redress
for alleged violations of the relevant treaty by their government. For a general description of
these various processes see STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1.
" Apart from the American Convention, each relevant treaty authorizes the petitioning
process only for those state parties that specially consent. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171; CERD,
supra note 53, art. 14; CAT, supra note 53, art. 22. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 6, 1999) (entered into force Dec. 22, 2000). As of November 2006, eighty-
three states had become parties to the Protocol. Division for the Advancement of Women,
Signatures and Accessions/Ratifications to the Optional Protocol, http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/sigop.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). By March 2006, the
Committee had rendered views concerning three communications. See id. (follow
"Decisions/Views" hyperlink). The Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), which held its first
session in 2004, will have competence to hear individual complaints once ten state parties
declare themselves subject to the process authorized in Article 77 of the Convention. See Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies-Complaints
Procedures, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm (last visited Nov. 9,2006).
A draft optional protocol that would create an individual communications process under the
CESCR is now under consideration by a special working group of the CHR. See id. (follow
"CESCR" hyperlink). Parties to the American Convention subject themselves to the
Convention's individual petitioning process before the Inter-American Commission by virtue
of joining the treaty. American Convention, supra note 33, art. 44. They may also, at their
discretion, subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court, which reviews
decisions made by the Commission regarding individual petitions. See id. art. 62.
56 See generally Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics
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members of the European Convention and the Council of Europe. 7 Although
not without exceptions, the decisions of the ECHR are generally respected and
implemented by the state parties of the European Convention." In some
senses, the European system provides evidence regarding how traditional
approaches to human rights enforcement might work under the right
circumstances. 9
The ECHR's success in securing compliance, while not unblemished, 0
stands in sharp contrast to the record of other international petitioning systems.
The Inter-American system, for example, has had limited success in enforcing
the decisions of its Commission and Court, even though those decisions are
also technically "binding" under the American Convention on Human Rights.6
The enforcement record regarding decisions of the treaty-based bodies, such
of the New ECHR Control Mechanism as Established in Protocol 11 Signed on 11 May 1994,
15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81, 82 (1994); Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 282-337.
" European Convention, supra note 54, art. 34.
58 See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text. Most commentators, and the ECHR itself,
see Council of Europe, Executions of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human-rights/execution/0 IIntroduction/0 1 -Introduction.asp#Topof
Page (last visited Nov. 9, 2006), suggest that there is a very high rate of state compliance with
the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 276, 296. Professors Yoo
and Posner, however, suggest that there is insufficient empirical data to support such assertions
regarding compliance with ECHR decisions. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial
Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (2005). But see Laurence
R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to
Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005) (challenging Posner and Yoo on their
methodology and conclusions).
59 See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
60 See Paul Mahoney, New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting
from the Expanding Case Load and Membership, 21 PENN ST. INT'LL. REV. 10 1, 101-02 (2002)
(discussing problems with caseload and delay); Christian Tomuschat, Quo VadisArgentoratum?
The Success Story of the European Convention on Human Rights-and a Few Dark Stains, 13
HuM. RTs. L.J. 401 (1992) (discussing problems with delay, implementation, and enforcement).
61 See, e.g., Jarmul, supra note 45, at 317-18; Kimberly D. King-Hopkins, Comment, Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights: Is Its Bark Worse than Its Bite in Resolving Human
Rights Disputes? 35 TuLSAL.J. 421,432-43 (2000). The successful outcome in the Court's very
first decided case strangely illustrates the difficulties of enforcement within the Inter-American
system. Only after a transition in government toward more democratic rule and fourteen years
of intransigence did the Honduran Government finally pay compensation for "disappearances"
it orchestrated in the 1980s. See Freddy Cuevas, Honduras Pays Victims'Families, DENVER
POST, Nov. 10, 2000, at A45 (reporting that the Honduran government paid $1.6 million dollars
to victims' families pursuant to the Inter-American Court's 1986 judgment in the Velazquez
disappearances case).
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as the Human Rights Committee, is even more disappointing.62 Given the
ambiguous legal status of its decisions and the absence of enforcement
mechanisms, it is perhaps more accurate to describe this disappointing record
as a lack of voluntary compliance rather than a failure of enforcement.
There are undoubtedly many reasons why it has proven difficult to enforce
the adjudicatory decisions of international human rights institutions outside the
context of Europe. Most significantly, however, states have found it easy to
ignore such decisions as the result of three related factors: (1) ambiguous
mandates and limited legal authority; (2) lack of meaningful legal or practical
incentives to induce state compliance; and (3) insufficient institutional
legitimacy to induce voluntary compliance.63
Governments have not found it particularly painful to ignore the views and
recommendations of most international human rights institutions because there
are few, if any, serious consequences associated with doing so. Most
governments comply with such decisions only when it is politically expedient
to do so. 64 Lacking mechanisms that compel compliance through sanction or
other meaningful practical incentives, enforcement of international decisions
depends entirely on the political goodwill of the government concerned. Given
that the government is, by definition, the perpetrator of the alleged violation,
it is hardly surprising that compliance is the exception, especially in states
ruled by oppressive regimes. There is, in this sense, an inherent contradiction
62 See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 1, 225, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (2002)
(estimating only 30% compliance); Report of the Human Rights Committee, Vol. 1, 256, U.N.
Doc. A/58/40 (2004) (noting trend of non-compliance and expressing "deep concern" over the
"increasing number of cases where States parties fail to implement the Committee's" final views
on individual petitions); Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7, at 345 (only eighty-one out of 154
states responded to the HRC's follow-up process for cases finding state violations of rights and
only 30% of these eighty-one responses expressed a willingness to comply); see also Dana D.
Fischer, International Reporting Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE 188 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1994); infra notes 76-77.
63 See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
4 Australia's compliance with the HRC's controversial Toonen decision is a good example
of this. Tasmania stood alone among Australian states in its outdated condemnation of
consensual homosexual conduct, and the Australian federal government was in full agreement
with the HRC on the merits. Nicholas Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). See also STEINER& ALSTON, supra note 1, at 740. Other
countries, however, may choose to comply with HRC decisions with which they disagreed.
WEISSBRODT, FITZPATRICK & NEWMAN, supra note 47, at 81-82 (discussing Lovelace v.
Canada). These successes demonstrate again that compliance depends upon the political
goodwill of the state, leaving enforcement least likely where it is needed most.
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built into the system's approach to enforcement, which leaves compliance
largely within the discretion of the perpetrators.
Reliance on voluntary compliance does not, of course, doom the human
rights system to failure. Indeed, voluntary compliance with the decisions of
respected international institutions should, ideally, have a central role in a
rationally designed international enforcement regime.65 Even in functioning
domestic legal systems, it is primarily respect for the authority of the
institution that ultimately renders judicial decisions readily enforceable, not
any inherent power wielded by the court itself.66 Voluntary compliance has
also been essential to the success of the European system.67 Although it
operates under sui generis circumstances, the European system relies heavily
65 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
66 President Andrew Jackson's alleged response to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), which would have potentially
conflicted with a federal policy of forcibly removing Native Americans from their ancestral
lands, highlights this point. Faced with the prospect of using federal authority to enforce the
decision against state officials, Jackson is alleged to have said: "[M]arshall has made his
decision, now let him enforce it." See Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Andrew Jackson: On
Indian Removal, available athttp://www.britannica.com/presidents/article-9116896 (last visited
Nov. 9, 2006).
67 In Europe, the failure to comply with the decisions of the ECHR may lead to action by the
Council of Europe, but the ECHR itself has no direct enforcement powers. Under Article 46 of
the Convention, member states pledge to "abide by" the Court's judgments. European
Convention, supra note 54. The Committee of Ministers, the central decision-making body in
the Council of Europe, has the authority to "supervise" compliance. It serves this function in a
systematic fashion by placing judgments on the public agenda of its regular meetings and
inviting the member state to report on compliance. See Council of Europe's Web site Dedicated
to the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, http://www.coe.int/T/
E/Human Rights/execution (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); see also Council of Europe, Rules of the
Committee of Ministers for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of
Friendly Settlements, available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human rights/execution/02_documents
/CMrules2006.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). On a practical level, effective enforcement also
depends upon each state's approach to incorporation of treaty obligations and the decisions of
international bodies, with national courts playing a prominent role. See, e.g., John Cary Sims,
Compliance Without Remands: The Experience Under The European Convention on Human
Rights, 36 Aiz. ST. L.J. 639,643-44(2004). There are many political, economic, and cultural
incentives within the European system that promote what is essentially voluntary compliance.
See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the
Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 551,605-11 (2004) (discussing how human rights norms
in Europe are "embedded" within a network of mutually beneficial reciprocal state interests); see
also Posner & Yoo, supra note 58, at 64-66. These circumstances clearly distinguish the
European system from other international human rights institutions. See infra notes 143-45 and
accompanying text.
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on national enforcement and voluntary government compliance with the
decisions of the ECHR. In this regard, the European system appears to thrive
by virtue of a happy coincidence of mutually reinforcing incentives and the
respect that the ECHR has earned overtime. Similarly, a critical reason for the
dearth of voluntary compliance outside Europe undoubtedly lies in the
fundamental lack of respect that states exhibit toward the authority of most
other existing human rights institutions and the paucity of incentives to induce
such respect and compliance.
This apparent lack of respect for the authority of international human rights
institutions is undoubtedly related to ambiguity regarding their legal mandate68
and doubts over the legitimacy of "external" international decision-making
regarding domestic practices.69 The problem in this sense is two-fold. On the
one hand, most international institutions have ambiguous or ill-defined legal
authority that potentially could be interpreted as including authoritative
jurisdiction over an extremely wide range of human rights issues, including
those with highly debatable or controversial substantive content. At the same
time, these institutions lack the attributes of institutional legitimacy that might
engender widespread state trust and respect. Outside of Europe, virtually all
of these international institutions suffer from politicized appointment
processes, lack of financial resources, poorly defined legal authority, failure
to utilize full-time professional judges, and flawed fact-finding processes.70
These international decision-makers are generally unaccountable in the most
literal sense, and render decisions that are, by definition, external to the body
politic where the alleged violations occurred.
More significantly, these institutions have also failed to carefully and
incrementally develop their own legitimacy and credibility over time in light
of practical limitations on their powers and capacities.71 They have, in
68 See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. Unresolved ambiguities over authority
have plagued international institutions from their inception. In many ways, the lack of human
rights enforcement has been defined by the persistent unresolved tension between international
and domestic authority regarding the status of international institutions, human rights treaties,
and international law itself. Most human rights treaties reflect this unresolved tension by leaving
the respective roles of international and domestic institutions ill-defined and ambiguous.
69 See Donoho, supra note 10, at 50-51.
70 See id. at 36, 51-52; Donoho, supra note 26, at 854-68.
"' One might, in this regard, contrast the historically incremental development of the
ECHR's authority with the recent controversial assertions of authority (whether legally justified
or not) by the HRC. Compare HOWARD CHARLES YouRow, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 196
(1996) (reviewing the incremental growth in the ECHR's legitimacy and authority), with Heifer,
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essence, failed to evolve an appropriate and realistic relationship vis-A-vis
domestic authority and democratic institutions. The circumstances of the
Human Rights Committee (HRC), created by the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are representative.
On the one hand, the substantive scope of human rights issues covered by
the ICCPR is enormous, including both rights over which little legitimate
dispute is possible (torture), as well as those raising morally charged issues
that are highly contested in domestic societies (privacy, free speech, gay
marriage). At the same time, the HRC's authority over this potentially wide
range of issues is poorly defined. Article Two of the ICCPR endorses the
primacy of national implementation and enforcement of rights, suggesting that
domestic institutions have primary authority to implement and remedy rights
recognized in the covenant.72 Yet, the Committee is required in its
consideration of state periodic reports and in "general comments" to monitor
state compliance with the treaty and provide guidance to the parties. Similarly,
under the individual petitioning process created by the ICCPR's Optional
Protocol, the HRC is called upon to render its "views" and recommend
appropriate remedies for violations. 73 Thus, while the HRC has no explicit
authority to render binding interpretations of the covenant itself,74 its functions
obviously require some implicit authority to interpret the meaning of rights.
What role is the HRC to have? Here, reasonable differences of opinion are
possible, although not encouraged by the treaty. The Committee itself has
essentially taken the position that states are bound by their treaty obligations
to implement the Committee's decisions.75 However reasonable this position
Backlash, supra note 46 (describing the controversy over decisions by the HRC regarding
application of the death penalty among Caribbean states). See also Heifer & Slaughter, supra
note 7, at315-17, 355-56,367 (also providing a general overview of similarities and differences
between the characteristics and circumstances of the HRC and the ECHR); Makau wa Mutua,
Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argumentfor De-Marginalizing Enforcement,
4 BUFF. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 211, 214-37, 252-60 (1998).
72 ICCPR, supra note 33, art. 2.
7 See Optional Protocol, supra note 33, art. 5(4) (directing the committee to consider
communications from individuals and "forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the
individual").
" Neither of the two general powers given to the HRC, to review state periodic reports and
issue general comments, include textual support for authoritative supervisory powers. ICCPR,
supra note 33, art. 40 ("study" periodic reports of state parties and "transmit its reports, and such
general comments as it may consider appropriate," to the parties). See also Mutua, supra note
71, at 235-39.
71 In 1994, the HRC declared in General Comment 24(52) that it had the authority to
determine the validity of state reservations. See Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-ninth Session of
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may be, it has only minimal textual support, and there is no evidence that the
Committee's decisions are treated as authoritative within the domestic systems
of the various state parties.76 Indeed, it seems probable that many state parties
never intended to create such authority and some major governments,
including the United States, have expressly disavowed its existence.77
Moreover, the HRC is sorely lacking in institutional attributes that might
enhance its legitimacy and engender state respect for its authority. The
eighteen part-time "experts" who serve on the committee come from diverse
backgrounds and cultures.78 The process for selecting such experts is largely
political, with virtually no democratic domestic involvement.79 The committee
the International Law Commission, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 110 (1998); William A. Schabas,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79,
90-95, 109 (1997). More controversial, the HRC also announced that reservations found
invalid, such as the U.S. reservations on the death penalty, were legally "severable" such that the
reserving state was a full party to the treaty as if no reservation had been entered. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 24, 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add.6 (Nov. 2, 1994).
More recently, the HRC has declared that Canada violated the ICCPR by refusing, pursuant to
an HRC interim measure, to stay the deportation of a man seeking review before the HRC.
Ahani v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 1051/2002, 1.2,5.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 (2004), available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/UNHRC/
2004/20.html.
76 The judgments of the HRC under the individual petitioning system, for example, are not
generally thought to be enforceable in the domestic courts of state parties. See, e.g., Ahani v.
Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2002] 58 O.R.3d 107, 108, 117-21 (Canada not bound to stay deportation
proceedings based on the views of the HRC). Perhaps more significantly, states have tended to
ignore the recommendations of treaty-based monitoring bodies. See supra notes 62-63 and
accompanying text.
77 See Government Responses, Observations on General Comment No. 24(52), on Issues
Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, CCPR
A/50/4OVol. 1, Annex VI (1996) (HRC has no power to issue binding interpretations); see also
Sylvia Brown Hamano, Incomplete Revolutions and Not So Alien Transplants: The Japanese
Constitution and Human Rights, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 415, 469-70 n.253 (1999) (suggesting
that Japanese courts have generally accepted government arguments that Japan is not bound by
HRC interpretations of the ICCPR); Helfer, supra note 46, at 1870-82 (describing the refusal
of some Caribbean states to comply with decisions of the HRC regarding capital punishment and
eventual renunciations of the ICCPR itself).
" See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights
Committee-Members, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/members.htm (last visited Nov.
9, 2006). Geographic diversity is ensured by the requirement that experts are selected in
accordance with the usual U.N. regional groupings. Id.
" See Donoho, supra note 10, at 17-18, 32-33, 32 n. 101, 36-37, 36 n. 110; see also Anne
F. Bayefsky, Direct Petition in the U.N. Human Rights Treaty System, 95 ASIL PROC. 71, 74
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has no real fact-finding processes, no appellate review process, and virtually
no oversight.80 Under these circumstances, it is simply not surprising that
governments have been slow in legitimizing the HRC's work product and
reluctant to concede its authority. The circumstances of the HRC are typical
of international human rights institutions. Outside of the context of Europe,
the status and legal authority of international decision-making in human rights
are ambiguous at best, and international human rights forums typically lack
important institutional attributes that might boost their legitimacy.
The ambiguous authority and weak institutional characteristics of
international human rights institutions reflect the deeper underlying causes of
their current ineffectiveness. Useful contrasts may be drawn between the
European system and the other human rights institutions. The European Court
of Human Rights has been successful not just because of its clear mandates
and strong institutional attributes, or because of its intelligent decision-making.
Rather, the Court also owes its success to the generally favorable political
conditions within the member states, cultural and social affinities, rational
jurisprudential limits on its authority, and the political and economic
incentives that are associated with compliance and membership in the system."
None of these factors is present in the larger more diverse international
community and are not likely to develop in the near future.
D. Distinctions Among Rights, Institutional Legitimacy, and Practical
Incentives
There is, in a certain sense, a degree of incoherence built into the
international system's general approach to enforcement. This incoherence
implicates the very rationale for developing an international system of human
rights in the first place. Lacking democratic safeguards, oppressive regimes
(2001) (asserting that 50% of the 950 experts sitting on the four U.N. Treaty institutions with
petitioning mechanisms over a twenty year period had jobs with their home government).
0 Most cases before the HRC do not turn on factual disputes but rather involve legal
disputes regarding the consistency of government action with the treaty. Nevertheless, individual
petitions are considered based solely on documentation provided by the petitioner and
responding state, leaving little room for accurate resolution of factual conflict. See STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 1, at 536.
"I See Douglas Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search
for Meaningful Standards, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 345, 363-65 (1991); cf Posner & Yoo, supra
note 58, at 61-62 (characterizing the "institutional setting" of the European Court of Justice as
more like a "domestic court" because of the "bonds" created by the European Union). See
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 536.
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face few domestic constraints on their treatment of people. The international
human rights system seeks to create constraints in the form of international
institutions and rules that might limit or temper government abuse of people.
The internationalization of rights is, in essence, the search for higher authority
to constrain the repressive power of abusive governments.8"
Yet, no such higher authority currently exists.8 3 The international legal
system is generally still deeply conmitted to state sovereignty, and legal
obligations depend almost exclusively upon state consent."' Nor is the
development of such authority in human rights institutions likely in the
foreseeable future. Outside of the relatively cohesive regional context of
Europe, there are currently few incentives to create and adhere to broad grants
of unambiguous international authority over human rights.8 5
Governments, whether progressive and enlightened, or oppressive and
corrupt, naturally resist the idea of binding authoritative decision-making by
"external" international institutions, particularly independent ones-at least
with regard to their own actions. Within functioning constitutional
democracies that generally respect basic rights, the incentives to create and
comply with authoritative international human rights institutions are limited
and the downside significant. Such states generally have their own extensive
domestic safeguards to protect individual rights. However imperfect these
domestic protections may sometimes be, delegation of authority over such
82 There are of course other important motivations for maintaining the international system
of rights, such as the progressive improvement in social and economic conditions. Such goals,
however, do not imply or require authoritative legal status for international institutions.
83 One could certainly argue reasonably that the ECHR is an example of such higher
authority and its potential for human rights enforcement. However reasonable this viewpoint,
it is equally clear that Europe and the ECHR are, in many significant ways, suigeneris. See infra
notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
4 It has become almost clich6 to assert that traditional notions of sovereignty have changed
significantly over the last fifty years. Extravagant claims about the demise of sovereignty,
however, seem exaggerated when one considers actual state practice. International obligations
still ultimately rest on state consent that can be withdrawn or altered within each state's
discretion. And, even in the context of highly developed international legal regimes such as the
WTO, states have surrendered sovereignty only cautiously and provisionally, retaining discretion
whether to bear the economic consequences of non-compliance with international dispute
settlement and decision-making processes. What can be said is that absolute state sovereignty,
to the extent that it ever actually existed, has been eroded in the sense that there is increased
international cooperation among states and expanded reliance on international norms and
institutions to resolve some of their mutual concerns and problems.
85 See supra notes 60-62, infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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issues to international institutions carries with it a potentially troubling loss of
self-governance and accountability vital to democracy.1
6
Among repressive authoritarian governments, the reasons to resist the
creation of effective international authority are more obvious. Authoritative
international institutions would threaten not only the undemocratic
government's prerogatives but also could challenge its legitimacy and hold on
power. Indeed, all states have certain cynical incentives in maintaining a
human rights system that lacks authoritative institutions capable of binding,
enforceable decision-making. Such arrangements allow states to appear
righteous, appease critics, and avoid undesirable international pressure while
avoiding the real prospect of meaningful change.
Perhaps most importantly, the international community also currently lacks
practical incentives to create an effective system of international enforcement
of human rights. Any system that effectively enforces human rights against
recalcitrant governments will involve sanctions that pose potentially significant
costs to other competing interests such as trade, security, or foreign relations.
History has shown that political and economic power is a better indicator of
which governments may face international condemnation than actual human
rights conditions. Undoubtedly most states generally place their own
economic self-interest above principled responses to human rights conditions
outside their own territory.
8 7
Under these circumstances, governments of all stripes have strongly
favored an emphasis on national enforcement and implementation of human
rights via domestic institutions, conceding only limited and ambiguous
authority for international bodies to supervise that process. They have
86 See Donoho, supra note 10, at 49-64. There are undoubtedly significant human benefits
that derive from involvement in an international human rights system even in the context of well-
functioning constitutional democracies. In many instances, the international community may
provide incentives for improvement, and a prevailing international consensus might induce
changes in social attitudes. The point here is simply that the case for providing international
institutions with authoritative enforcement powers over contested moral issues is not compelling
in the context of constitutional democracies in light of the accompanying losses of democratic
accountability and self-governance. In contrast, when governments abuse fundamental rights
relating to physical integrity or central political rights, the need for effective outside interference
is obviously greater and the potential losses to local democratic choice and autonomy minimal.
See id at 61-64.
87 See, e.g., Majorie Cohn, Human Rights Hypocrisy, TRuTHouT, Feb. 27, 2006, http://
www.truthout.org/docs_2006/022706J.shtml; Joseph Loconte, Reforming the Human Rights
Agenda ofthe UnitedNations, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.heritage.
org/Research/IntemationalOrganizations/bg 1877.cfn.
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correspondingly limited international institutions to anemic enforcement
capacities, leaving voluntary compliance the order of the day.
This reliance on national enforcement and volunteerism creates the
unfortunate irony that the international human rights system is most needed
where it is least effective, and most effective where it is least needed. In
oppressive states, domestic institutions are incapable of enforcing human
rights. Thus, where most needed-under oppressive regimes violating the
most fundamental and universally accepted rights-the international system's
traditional emphasis on voluntary domestic compliance with toothless
international supervision is utterly inadequate and doomed to failure. Where
potentially most effective-in those democratic states which respect the rule
of law-an authoritative international system is least needed and poses
significant costs to democracy."8
These competing forces have produced a complex and ill-defined balance
between international and domestic authority that is still evolving but hardly
satisfactory or even rational. The international system uneasily straddles the
competing goals of preserving democratic sovereignty and autonomy, and
effectively enforcing human rights against repressive regimes. Two of the
most significant components in this dilemma are the legitimacy deficit of
international human rights organizations described above and the broad scope
of issues potentially under theirjurisdiction. There is an important correlation
here between these factors and the human rights system's historical refusal to
distinguish among different categories of rights for enforcement purposes.
Human rights institutions (and many states) have historically resisted
recognition of a hierarchy among rights even for enforcement purposes. This
resistance has been based primarily on the ideological position that economic
and social rights are of equal importance to civil and political rights. 9
8 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
89 Historically, many non-Western nations have taken the position that economic and social
rights have priority over civil and political rights. See generally Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly
Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from
Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 467, 469 (1983). See also Melanne Andromecca Civic,
A ComparativeAnalysis ofInternational and Chinese Human Rights Law--Universality Versus
Cultural Relativism, 2 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 285, 320-22 (1996) (describing China's continuing
adherence to the argument that economic rights take priority over civil and political liberties).
Western states have uniformly rejected that position while at the same time have cast doubt about
the justiciability of economic and social rights. See generally Michael J. Dennis & David P.
Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an
International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and
Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'LL. 462,472-74 (2004). These divergent positions, largely political and
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Whatever the relative merits of that debate, it fails to address the practical
realities of enforcement. Indeed, distinctions among rights for purposes of
enforcement are not hierarchies in the sense of importance at all. Rather, the
point of such distinctions is that some rights enjoy a consensus over meaning
that lends itself to successful international enforcement and the potential
development of more meaningful international institutional arrangements and
incentives for compliance.
In the context of our complex and diverse world community, the
international enforceability of all rights is not the same. Certain violations,
such as torture and most crimes against humanity, have a relatively non-
controversial and universal meaning. They involve conduct that is readily
identifiable, easily proved, and universally condemned by all. For these
reasons, such violations are highly suitable for authoritative international
enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, an enforcement focus on this limited
range of universally accepted rights substantially enhances the potential for
improving institutional legitimacy and alleviating fears about usurpation of
democratic prerogatives.
The failure to distinguish among rights for enforcement purposes also
relates directly to the more general problem of institutional legitimacy and
credibility noted earlier. Existing human rights bodies lack institutional
capacity and characteristics of legitimacy that can engender the trust and
respect necessary to support either voluntary compliance or allocation of
meaningful enforcement authority. A central aspect of this problem is a failure
of human rights institutions to develop an appropriate role that accounts for
differences among rights and respect for genuine democratic choice.
Both voluntary compliance and authoritative vertical enforcement by
international institutions have important and mutually reinforcing functions in
a world characterized by diversity and conflict. For some rights, an approach
emphasizing promotion and voluntary compliance with international standards,
rather than authoritative enforcement, makes sense. For genuinely contestable
rights whose meaning or application is subject to public debate within
functioning democratic societies, authoritative international enforcement is
unnecessary, impractical, and counterproductive given its implications for
rhetorical, initially resulted in the creation of separate international covenants for these two
groups of rights. Later, the tension between these viewpoints led to numerous United Nations
pronouncements about the "indivisibility" and "interdependence" of human rights and a clear
aversion to any distinctions among rights, however rational. See, e.g., Indivisibility and
Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil, and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/130,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/130 (Dec. 15, 1989).
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democracy. Conversely, for universally accepted and uncontestable rights like
torture, authoritative international enforcement is both necessary and
achievable. A failure to recognize this practical reality has inhibited the
development of meaningful international enforcement mechanisms.
The international system's traditional approach to enforcement has failed,
at least in part, because of a failure to recognize such distinctions. Already
saddled with weak institutional characteristics and ambiguous grants of
authority, international human rights bodies are unlikely to engender sufficient
state respect to create more authoritative enforcement mandates absent a more
practical and nuanced approach regarding different categories of rights.
What can and should be done to address these weaknesses and create a
meaningful system of human rights enforcement in the twenty-first century?
There are, of course, no easy answers to this question. Reforms should,
however, focus on the weaknesses and practical limitations described above.
In this regard, important insights can be drawn from developing alternatives
to the traditional enforcement model and from the success of the ECHR.
III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENFORCEMENT: THE EVOLVING
NEW PARADIGMS
The last decade has witnessed the continuing development of important
alternatives to the traditional model of human rights enforcement. 90 These
alternatives include the use of domestic criminal processes as reflected in the
Pinochet litigation, 9' the use of domestic civil processes following the
Filartiga line of cases,92 and the development of international criminal law
90 There is a significant body of literature exploring each of these developments, some of
which categorizes and evaluates them together as "transnational" law and process. See, e.g.,
William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the
MAove Toward a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129
(2000); William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002).
91 The Pinochet case and its implications have produced divergent perspectives regarding
the appropriate limits of human rights litigation and use of domestic criminal processes. See,
e.g., Aceves, supra note 90; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet andInternational
Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2129 (1999); Jonathan I. Charney, Comment,
Progress in International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1999).
92 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit's decision in
Filartiga, upholding federal court jurisdiction over human rights violations committed against
aliens overseas, has generated a tremendous outpouring of scholarly work. Among many helpful
articles arguing for expansive use of the Alien Tort Statute see, for example, Beth Stephens,
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processes such as the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Bosnia, and the
permanent International Criminal Court.93 Each of these alternatives has its
problems, and none is an enforcement panacea.94 As detailed below, however,
these alternative approaches do provide some direct advantages over existing
approaches to human rights enforcement and, more significantly, offer
Translating Filrtiga: A Comparative and International LawAnalysis ofDomestic Remedies for
International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Beth Stephens, Taking
Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 485 (2001); Ryan Goodman
& Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights andFederal Common
Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463, 514 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense about
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM
L. REv. 371 (1997); and Beth Van Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic
Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments
Convention, 42 HARV. INT'LL.J. 141 (2001). Critics of the Filartiga paradigm include Bradley,
supra note 18; and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319, 356-68 (1997). The case has
also spawned considerable litigation, including lawsuits against multinational corporations. See
Stephens, supra note 18, at 43 7-38 (noting that there have been approximately 100 cases leading
to published decisions under the Alien TOA Claims Act (ATCA)); Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler,
Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational Corporations for Human Rights
Abuses Abroad, 30 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 359 (1999) (describing and arguing in favor of
litigation aimed at multinationals). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), placed significant, although yet to be fully elaborated, limitations
on actions brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). See infra note 116 and
accompanying text. See generally The Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, Federal
Statues and Regulations, 118 HARV. L. REv. 446 (2004); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004).
"I Perhaps the best places to find factual and legal background information on the United
Nations' ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are their respective websites.
See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), http://www.un.org/icty
(last visited Nov. 9, 2006); International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), http://www.ictr.
org (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). Much has been written, of course, about these tribunals and how
they have functioned. For a thought provoking critique of these tribunals focused on Rwanda,
see Josd E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 365 (1999). See also Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda
Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 167 (1997). A third ad hoc tribunal with distinct
characteristics was created in 2001 by agreement between the Security Council and Sierra Leone
regarding human rights crimes committed during that country's recent civil conflict. S.C. Res.
1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000). See generally Laura R. Hall & Nahal Kazemi, Prospects
for Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone, 44 HARv. INT'L L.J. 287 (2003). The "mixed"
domestic and international process of this "Special Court for Sierra Leone" recently served as
a model for similar institutions in East Timor and Cambodia. ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 343 (2003).
9 See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
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important insights regarding potential reform of the existing international
system. These advantages and insights stem primarily from three
characteristics shared by each alternative. The first is a common focus on a
fairly narrow range of well-defined and universally agreed upon human rights
norms. The second is general reliance on, or creation of, neutral judicial
institutions with clearly defined and appropriately constrained legal authority
over these universally understood and non-controversial rights. The third is
recognition of individual accountability for the violation of such rights.
A. National Criminalization of International Law Violations: The Pinochet
Model
In 1996, Spanish judicial authorities accepted jurisdiction to conduct a
criminal investigation regarding alleged human rights violations committed by
government authorities in Argentina and Chile during those countries' military
dictatorships.95 In October 1998, Judge Baltazar Garzon requested that the
United Kingdom extradite former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to Spain
to face criminal charges resulting from this investigation. The relevant
indictment charged Pinochet with conspiracy to commit torture, hostage
taking, genocide, and summary execution of both Chilean and Spanish citizens
during his seventeen year reign of terror that began with a September 11, 1973
coup.96 This request for extradition asserted not only jurisdiction based on
alleged crimes against Spanish citizens, often referred to as "passive
jurisdiction,"97 but also for crimes against Chilean citizens under a theory of
universal jurisdiction.98 The British courts denied extradition as to many of the
" For a clear account of the factual background of the case, see Richard J. Wilson,
Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, 6(3) HuM. RTs. BRIEF 3 (1999). See also Diane F. Orentlicher,
Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J.
1057, 1070-86 (2004) (providing a detailed description of the Pinochet case from the factual
background through the extradition process); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and
Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 311-15 (2001).
96 Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1074; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 95, at 311-15.
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 cmt. g (1987) (providing the commonly accepted definition of passive personality
jurisdiction); Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1074; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 95, at 314-15.
98 See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1073-74. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) (providing definition and
description of universal jurisdiction); PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23 (2001), available at http://www.
princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf [hereinafter PRINCETON PROJECT]. Professor Orentlicher
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alleged crimes on technical legal grounds relating to the requirement of dual
criminality.99 The British House of Lords, however, ultimately approved the
extradition request as to a limited number of crimes alleged to have occurred
after British accession to the Torture Convention.'00 U.K. foreign minister,
Jack Straw, ultimately denied the extradition request on discretionary grounds
related to Pinochet's allegedly failing mental health.'0 '
The Court's decision, although more limited than many advocates hoped,
directly supported the proposition that universal jurisdiction may justify
points out that there are few clear prior examples of national courts relying on principles of
universal jurisdiction to justify prosecution of criminal conduct that took place outside of their
territorial jurisdiction. Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1073-74. Israel's prosecution of Adolf
Eichmann is a commonly cited example. Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 26
(Dist. Ct. Jer.) (1961), aff'd, 36 I.L.R. 277,298 (S. Ct.) (1962). See also United States v. Yunis,
681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Originally
developed in response to piracy, see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 153, 156 (1820)
("[P]irates being hostes humani generis, are punishable in the tribunals of all nations. All
nations are engaged in a league against them for the mutual defence and safety of all."), universal
jurisdiction remains a critical concept in contemporary international criminal law. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and
Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 102-34, 151-56 (2001); Mary Robinson,
Forward to PRINCETON PROJECT, supra, at 14-18; see also Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'LL.J. 183 (2004)
(critiquing the analogy to piracy as a justification for modern applications of universal
jurisdiction).
" Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 147
(H.L. 1999). See Frank Sullivan, Jr., A Separation of Powers Perspective on Pinochet, 14 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 409, 415-37 (2004) (providing a detailed description of the legal
proceedings in the United Kingdom, including the legal analysis provided by the House of
Lords).
'oo See Exparte Pinochet, 1 A.C. at 198-201; see also Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1079-80
nn. 121-30 (providing a detailed description of the various opinions forming the basis for the
House of Lords' judgment).
"' See Sullivan, Jr., supra note 99, at 437-40. A commonly cited problem with utilizing
universal jurisdiction to prosecute individuals having little or no connection to the forum
involves resistance in the home nation to outside interference. See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The
Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001 at
86; Anthony Sammons, The "Under-Theorization "of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications for
Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 111,
140-43 (2003). The exercise of universal jurisdiction also raises legitimate fears of bias,
violations of due process, politically motivated prosecutions, and increased international conflict.
See, e.g., Madeline H. Morris, Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: Conference Remarks,
35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 337, 340, 352-59 (2001); K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and
Structural Reasonableness, 40 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-2 (2004) (suggesting that traditional
constraints on judicial action alleviate many concerns).
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domestic criminal prosecution of certain violations of international human
rights in states other than the one in which the offending acts were
committed. 2 More controversially, the decision also recognized important
limitations on public official immunities."' The British and Spanish courts,
in essence, recognized that Pinochet, and others like him, could be prosecuted
for certain universal crimes through the domestic criminal processes of any
state that obtains personal jurisdiction over him. Citing criminal investigations
or complaints brought in Belgium, Senegal, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom,
Professor Diane Orentlicher reports that a "raft of countries have walked
through the door the Pinochet case opened."" Enthusiasm for Pinochet-styled
prosecutions has apparently waned, however, in light of controversial criminal
complaints brought against prominent current or former public officials, such
as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, former President Bush, Colin Powell,
General Tommy Franks, and Dick Cheney, among others.'0 5
102 Aceves, supra note 90, at 169-71; Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1074.
103 See Exparte Pinochet, 1 A.C. at 206-24; see also Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1080-89.
Spanish judicial authorities also separately ruled against Pinochet's claims of immunity. See
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 95, at 312. Among the primary reasons that judicial refusal to
recognize traditional immunities is controversial involves alleged interference with national
reconciliation compromises and foreign affairs. See Diane F. Orentlicher, SettlingAccounts: The
Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2543-46
(1991). The International Court of Justice, however, recently reaffirmed immunities in the case
of The Congo v. Belgium, at least for incumbent public officials. Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEframe.htm. See Sarah C. Rispin, Implications of Democratic
Republic of The Congo v. Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent: A Setback for International
Human Rights Litigation?, 3 CI. J. INT'L L. 527, 527-30, 535-36 (2002); see also Press
Release, International Court of Justice, Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v.
France), Press Release 2003/15 (Apr. 23, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
ipresscom/ipress2003/ipresscom2003-15_xx_20030422.htm (challenge to the legality of
France's pursuit of criminal charges against the Congolese Interior Minister Pierre Oba).
'0 Orentlicher, supra note 95, at 1059-60.
105 See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium 's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
888, 891-94 (2003); Damien Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium, 3
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 400, 404-09; Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone by its
Global Reach: Cases Against Political Figures Sparked Crises, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2003,
at Al; see also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 85,
147-48(2004). Spain's high court has also apparently retreated somewhat from the implications
of Magistrate Garzon's pursuit of General Pinochet, imposing limitations on potential
applications of universal criminal jurisdiction in Spanish courts. See Antonio Cassese,
Comment, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal
Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT'LCRIM. JUST. 589,590 (2003) (noting that the Spanish high court suggests
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B. The Filartiga Civil Litigation Paradigm
In 1980, the Second Circuit upheld federal district jurisdiction over a civil
claim brought by a Paraguayan citizen against a Paraguayan public official for
torture that occurred in Paraguay.0 6 Building slowly over subsequent years,
the Filartiga model for civil liability against human rights violators has now
generated a substantial number of cases,"0 7 recently including those directed
at multinational corporations.' Much written about,"0 9 this enforcement
that universal jurisdiction is "subsidiary" to prosecution in the home state and that additional
links to Spain will normally be required).
106 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In 1976, local police officials
kidnapped the Filartigas' seventeen-year old son, Joelito, tortured him to death and presented
his battered body to his sister. Shortly after fleeing Paraguay, the family was shocked to discover
a key instigator of this horrific crime, Pena-Irala, had illegally taken up residence in the New
York City area. Based on information provided by the Filartigas, Pena-Irala was eventually
deported from the United States after being served with a federal court civil complaint seeking
compensation for Joelito's death. Id. at 876-79.
107 Professor Stephens, an experienced human rights litigator who has written extensively on
the ATCA, has reported that "approximately one hundred cases leading to decisions available
online have alleged jurisdiction under the ATCA and related statutes...." Stephens, supra note
18, at 437-38. See also Boyd, supra note 101, at 2 n.6 & app. A (cataloguing ninety-two cases,
nearly 80% of which resulted in summary judgment or dismissal); Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green
& Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in
U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 169,
173 (2005) (citing "at least sixteen" successful suits). Two organizations, the Center for Justice
and Accountability, http://www.cja.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2006), and the Center for
Constitutional Rights, http://www.ccr-ny.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2006), have served prominent
roles in bringing actions against human rights violators before U.S. courts. Although many cases
have been brought, relatively few have resulted in judgments, and almost none have resulted in
actual collection of damages. See infra note 155. But see Alfonso Chardy, Torture Lawsuit
Halts Lotto Winnings, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 31, 2006, at Al (state court orders that annual
lottery payments of former Haitian Army Colonel Carl Dorelien be placed in escrow pending
resolution of Alien Torts Claims Act litigation in federal court).
108 See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932,952-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying summary
judgment on claims that Unocal was liable under the ATCA for aiding the Myanmar military in
acts of murder, rape, and forced labor); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (later dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds in Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). See
generally Recent Developments, Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human
Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2025 (2001); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.: A New Standard for the Enforcement of International Law in U.S. Courts?, 5
YALE HUM. RTs. & DEV. L.J. 241 (2002). The Unocal case was recently settled. See Center for
Constitutional Rights, Docket: Doe v. Unocal, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/corporate_
accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjlD=lrRSFKnnmm&Content=45 (last visited Nov. 9,
2006]
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alternative essentially envisions opening regular domestic civil courts to
human rights victims seeking redress for violations occurring outside of the
forum.
In the United States, where such remedies have been most prominently
pursued, jurisdiction is conferred by statute and subject to significant
limitations."0 These limitations include tight restrictions on suing foreign
government defendants,"' due process requirements regarding personal
jurisdiction that essentially require, as a practical matter, the physical presence
of individual defendants in the United States," 2 and significant restrictions on
available causes of action. Given the limited legal status of U.S. human rights
treaty commitments,"13 customary international law has played a central role
2006). The business community and the Bush administration have launched a frontal assault on
such suits. See Bush v. Alien Torts, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 6, 2003, http://www.motherjones.
com/news/dailymojo/2003/08/we 522 03a.html; Harold Hongju Koh, Wrong on Rights, YALE
GLOBAL, July 18, 2003, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2121 (criticizing the Bush
administration's position).
109 There is a mountain of excellent literature regarding the ATCA ranging from discourse
over its history to the policy implications of utilizing customary international law to remedy
human rights violations with no direct nexus to the United States. See supra authorities cited
in note 92.
10 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). It is standard practice
in U.S. human rights litigation to allege alternative bases for subject matter jurisdiction,
including federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and universal jurisdiction as a
matter of customary international law.
. "1 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1605 (2000), has made it
nearly impossible to successfully sue foreign governments and their instrumentalities in U.S.
courts for violations of human rights. See Coliver et al., supra note 107, at 187-88. The only
potentially viable exception to immunity under the Act relates to violations against U.S. citizens
by foreign governments designated as state sponsors of terrorism. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)
(2000); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997; see also Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419
(9th Cir. 1989) (cases in which a foreign state committed a human rights violation on United
States territory, thereby losing its immunity under § 1605(a)(5)).
12 See Van Schaack, supra note 92, at 153-55, 176, 194-96 (describing the importance of
"presence" as a basis for personal jurisdiction in ATCA litigation and its role during negotiations
of the Hague Judgments Convention). Van Schaack describes significant opposition to so-called
"tag" jurisdiction that has served as the basis for some ATCA lawsuits such as the Kadic case.
Id.
"3 The United States has ratified several major international human rights treaties but,
without exception, has declared each of these treaties to be "non-self-executing." See Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 399, 416-23 (2000). The United States has also attached a series of "RUD's"
(reservations, understandings, or declarations) to each human rights treaty it has ratified. These
provisions are designed to systematically eliminate potential conflicts with preexisting U.S. law
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in the development of the Filartiga paradigm.1 4 Since only a small number
of human rights violations are considered part of customary international
law," 5 lower federal courts have recognized a limited number of actionable
violations. The Supreme Court has recently placed further, potentially
significant, limits on the types of violations that may be actionable under the
ATCA. 16 Although United States legislation specifically authorizes causes of
action for certain foreign victims of torture and summary execution,' the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the ATCA essentially suggests that
and practice. See, e.g., Kristina Ash, US. Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM.
RTS. 7 (2005); Louis Henkin, Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'LL. 341,345-48 (1995); see also Ann Elizabeth Mayer,
Reflections on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDA W: Should the Constitution Be
an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 747-67 (1996). Such treaty
obligations are, therefore, unenforceable under domestic law, and U.S. courts have refused to
remedy their violation under the ATCA unless the alleged violation can be established as part
of customary international law. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir.
1980); Jama v. U.S. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 357-61 (D.N.J. 2004).
114 Filartiga and the ATCA have, for example, figured prominently in the academic debate
over the legitimacy of customary international law as a source of U.S. domestic law. See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley& Jack L. Goldsmith, CustomaryInternationalLaw as Federal Common Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815 (1997); Goodman & Jinks, supra
note 92; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739-52 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1987) (listing these seven
violations: genocide, torture, murder or causing disappearance, slavery, systematic racial
discrimination, prolonged arbitrary detention, and a "consistent pattern of gross violations").
16 In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court upheld use of the ATCA to litigate
alleged human rights violations occurring overseas but placed significant limits on which
violations could be actionable. 542 U.S. at 712-28. In many ways consistent with lower court
rulings, the Court found that the ATCA is purely a jurisdictional statute under which only those
violations that share certain characteristics with claims judicially cognizable when the statute was
adopted in 1787, such as piracy, can be brought. Id. While the precise meaning of this standard
is debatable, it is consistent with lower court decisions that have only recognized claims
involving "specific, universal and obligatory" norms of international law. See In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); The Supreme Court,
supra note 92; Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: "The Door Is Still Ajar"
for Human Rights Litigation in US. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 533 (2005) (reviewing the
history of the ATCA and its future after the Sosa decision); see also Kontorovich, supra note 92.
"7 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (TVPA). The TVPA has
been described as "codifying" the holding of Filartiga. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp.
128, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Its primary impetus, however, was to dispel any doubt about the
existence of a cause of action under the ACTA for torture and summary execution. See Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4 (1991); Goodman & Jinks, supra note
92, at 468.
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recognition of remedies for other violations will be limited to those
comparable to eighteenth century customary international law paradigms, such
as piracy."'
C. The Developing Use of International Criminal Law Processes
A third significant development in human rights enforcement involves the
continuing evolution of international criminal law and its processes. Between
Nuremberg and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, international
criminal law remained mired in world politics with little practical salience to
human rights victims. The prospects for an effective international criminal law
process for human rights violations were kept alive only in academic circles
and on the backburners of a few obscure international institutions.
Atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, however, revived the
prospects for creating an effective international criminal enforcement regime.
Viewed as a threat to peace, these atrocities prompted the U.N. Security
Council to establish two ad hoc tribunals with a mandate to deploy
international humanitarian law in the defense of human rights." 9 Despite
substantial obstacles, 20 the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
"18 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. See supra note 116.
..9 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993);
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighbouring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 3453d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). Each tribunal has the authority "to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law" committed in limited
geographical areas and time frames. Id. art. 1. However, due to distinctions drawn by
international humanitarian law between international and internal civil conflicts, there are
differences in the subject matter jurisdiction of the two tribunals. See Mark R. Von Sternberg,
A Comparison of the Yugoslavian andRwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction
and the "'Elementary Dictates of Humanity, " 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 113-21 (1996). In
particular, only the ICTY is technically empowered to enforce grave breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, while both Tribunals may prosecute customary international law violations
involving war crimes (Art. 3), genocide (Art. 4), and crimes against humanity (Art. 5). Id.
,20 See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals: Crime &
Punishment in the InternationalArena, 25 NOVA L. REV. 463,468-70 (2001) (former president
of the tribunal describing the initial lack of support for its work); Mutua, supra note 93, at
180-85 (citing lack of resources and inadequate cooperation as serious impediments to the
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(ICTY) has indicted 161 alleged perpetrators of serious violations of
humanitarian law.12' The Tribunal has found approximately fifty defendants
guilty and approximately thirty are currently serving their sentence or awaiting
transfer. 22 More than eighty other defendants are on trial, in detention, or
under provisional release. Until his recent death, these defendants included the
former leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic' 23 The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda has completed twenty-eight prosecutions, primarily of
public officials, for crimes relating to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 24 As of
June 2006, twenty-seven additional defendants were on trial.'25 Although
subject to legitimate criticisms,"' these ad hoc tribunals have, without doubt,
exceeded most expectations. 1
27
The success of these ad hoc tribunals provided the needed political will to
revitalize longstanding U.N. plans to establish a permanent international
criminal court. 2 s Since the ICC began operations in 2002,129 it has received
tribunals' work).
.2 See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ICTY at a Glance, http://
www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Fact Sheets, Achievements of the ICTR,
http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/factsheets/achievements.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
125 Id.
126 See generally Jose E. Alvarez, supra note 93 (providing an insightful critique of the
premises which prompted the ad hoc tribunals and potential ill effects of primary international
jurisdiction); Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts andFair Trials: Difficulties and
Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'LL. 111, 116-37 (2002) (critiquing deficiencies relating to presenting
an effective defense); Todd Howland & William Calathes, The U.N. 's International Criminal
Tribunal, Is It Justice Or Jingoism for Rwanda? A Callfor Transformation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
135 (1998) (critiquing failures to develop a coherent vision of the tribunal in relation to human
rights generally and to national processes).
127 Perhaps in response to the perceived successes and failures of the first two ad hoc
tribunals, the international community has participated in the creation of "hybrid" or "mixed"
tribunals to address human rights violations in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor. See
generally CASSESE, supra note 93, at 343-46; Hall & Kazemi, supra note 93; Laura A.
Dickinson, Note and Comment, The Promise ofHybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'LL. 295,296-300
(2003). Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, these new tribunals are designed as "mixed" tribunals in
the sense that they incorporate and rely on both domestic and international law and are staffed
by both domestic and international decision-makers. See Dickinson, supra, at 296-300.
128 CASESSE, supra note 93, at 341. The initial impetus for a permanent international criminal
court came from the U.N. General Assembly after World War II. See G.A. Res. 260B (III), at
177, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948). For an account of these earlier efforts to establish the
Court and a brief history of modern international criminal law leading to the U.N. ad hoc
tribunals, see M. CherifBassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need
20061
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four requests to investigate situations alleged. to involve crimes under the
treaty. 3 Although important aspects of the Court's jurisdiction are distinct
from its predecessors,' the Court was clearly modeled after currently existing
ad hoc tribunals. Like the ad hoc tribunals, the Court is essentially designed
to address "serious crimes of concern to the international community" in the
general categories of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.'
Each category of crime is further defined in the Treaty to include a variety of
egregious violations of human rights committed in the context of armed
conflict, such as murder, ethnic cleansing, rape, and torture. 13 3 The Treaty also
creates a process for defining the required elements to the crimes. 134 While
some important and difficult disputes over the definition of such crimes have
and will arise,' the Court's substantive focus is limited to the most egregious
to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 11 (1997). See
also CASESSE, supra note 93, at 327-46.
129 The treaty establishing the Court came into force after receiving its sixtieth ratification in
2002. See ICC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 126; see Official Website of the ICC, About the ICC,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
130 The Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic have each referred situations
occurring within their territories to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and possible
prosecution. The Prosecutor is also now investigating the situation in Darfur, Sudan pursuant
to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005). See Official Website of the ICC, Situations
and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
... See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
"3 See ICC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 5(1). The Court will eventually also exercise
jurisdiction over the "crime of aggression," once the state parties reach agreement over the
definition of that controversial concept. Id. art. 5(2).
133 Id. arts. 6-8.
134 Id. art. 9.
131 Opponents of the ICC have cited, in addition to potential third-country jurisdiction over
U.S. military personnel, definitional ambiguity over critical concepts such as military necessity,
proportionality, military targets, and the crime of aggression. See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-
Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 89,95-96 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood,
The Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 209-13 (2001) (discussing the
crime of aggression among other definitional issues); see also Allison Marston Danner & Jenny
S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the
Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REv. 75 (2005); Symposium, The
International Response to the Environmental Impacts of War, 17 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV.
565, 625-26 (2005) (comments of Mark Drumbl); Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition Of
"Gender" in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Backfor
International Criminal Justice?, 18 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 55 (2005). But see David Hunt, The
International Criminal Court: High Hopes, "Creative Ambiguity "and an Unfortunate Mistrust
in International Judges, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 56 (2004) (criticizing an overly restrictive use of
detailed definitions that undermine flexibility).
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forms of human rights violations over which an international consensus
generally exists.
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, however, the ICC has broad geographic
jurisdiction but only complementary or subsidiary jurisdiction over the
prosecution of accused war criminals. 136 In effect, the ICC is designed to
prosecute violations of a clearly defined set of international crimes only when
the state of origin is unable or unwilling to do so in good faith. 137 The Rome
Treaty also allows for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over a non-party
national when that defendant commits prosecutable offenses in the territory of
a state party. 3 ' The Court may also exercise jurisdiction over a non-party
national who commits prosecutable crimes in a non-party state if that state
specially agrees to such jurisdiction. 139  This provision, and allegedly
insufficient Security Council oversight power, has caused considerable
controversy and figures prominently in the Bush administration's active
campaign to undermine the ICC and its potential jurisdiction over
Americans. '40
D. Lessons from the ECHR: Institutional Legitimacy and Practical Incentives
The ECHR is neither new, nor in the strict sense of the word, a developing
alternative to the traditional model of human rights enforcement. Originally
created just after World War II,41 the ECHR has had a longer history than
most international human rights bodies and considerably more success. In
many ways, the ECHR represents the only example of a traditional
136 ICC Treaty, supra note 43, art. 17.
131 Id. arts. 17-19.
138 Id. art. 12(2).
139 Id. art. 12(3).
141 See Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy: The Rome Statute's
Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63, 63-64 (2003); Goldsmith,
supra note 135, at 90-98; William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International
Criminal Court: It'sAllAbout the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT'LL. 701,714-19 (2004) (like
Goldsmith, also attributing independence from the U.N. Security Council as part of U.S.
opposition to the ICC).
141 Created under the Council of Europe, the Court was formed through the adoption of the
European Convention on Human Rights by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. European
Convention, supra note 54. The Convention preamble emphasizes the parties' commonalities,
describing members as "like-minded and hav[ing] a common heritage of political traditions,
ideals, freedom and the rule of law .. " Id. pmbl.
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international enforcement paradigm that functions effectively, albeit only on
a regional level.'42
There are, of course, many reasons to doubt whether the sui generis
circumstances of the ECHR qualify it to serve as a realistic model for other
more global institutions.'43 The community of nations that the ECHR serves
has been, at least until recently, significantly homogeneous with shared
cultural, social, and political affinities.' More importantly, the region has a
shared history and future, not the least of which involves the extraordinary
economic, social, and political entanglements of the European Union.
Although technically and legally distinct from the European Human Rights
system and the ECHR, the institutions of the EU have adopted significant
commitments to human rights, following the direction and guidance of the
ECHR.1" These linkages create vitally important incentives for compliance
142 See generally Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 7 (promoting the European system as a
model of effective international adjudication of human rights).
4 Donoho, supra note 81, at 363-66.
Membership in the Council of Europe has increased dramatically in recent years,
especially due to the addition of former socialist states from Central and Eastern Europe. Since
1990, membership in the Council has increased to forty-six states, with twenty-six new members
from Central and Eastern Europe. Council of Europe, the Council of Europe's Member States,
http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/aboutCoe/MemberStates/default.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
All of these states have also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights as an unwritten
precondition for membership in the Council. Rudolf Bernhardt, Current Development, Reform
of the Control Machinery Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Protocol No. 11,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 n.10 (1995). The addition of states such as Bulgaria, Russia, Albania,
Romania, and Slovenia has added significant new diversity to the European human rights system.
145 Over the course of many years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has slowly
incorporated human rights law, as developed and interpreted by the ECHR, into EU
jurisprudence. See generally Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in
Europe, 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 111-18 (2003). The ECJ has, however, declared that
the EU may not become a member of the European Convention:
As Community law now stands, the Community has no competence to accede
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms because no provision of the Treaty confers on the
Community institutions in a general way the power to enact rules concerning
human rights or to conclude international agreements in this field...
Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759. Recent revisions to the EU
treaty regime directly reference protection of human rights. See Shelton, supra, at 113-14. In
2000, the EU proclaimed a new Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. The proposed European
Constitution would directly incorporate the Charter and human rights into the EU legal structure.
See Stephen C. Sieberson, How the New European Union Constitution Will Allocate Power
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that are currently absent outside of Europe. Despite these important
differences in circumstances, the ECHR's successes provide important insights
regarding reform of international enforcement generally.
First, the ECHR serves as proof positive that there are many advantages to
regional rather than global approaches to human rights enforcement.
Regionalism may not only take advantage of cultural and social affinities (in
developing culturally sensitive interpretations of rights), but also profit from
critical economic and political linkages that create practical incentives for state
compliance. A regional focus also has advantages for institutional legitimacy
by increasing connections between decision-makers and local populations.
Second, although the ECHR currently renders judgments over a wide range
of human rights issues including controversial topics,'46 it has arrived at this
point incrementally over time as its prestige and credibility warranted. More
importantly, it has imposed on itself important jurisprudential limits that avoid
overreaching and undesirable interference with legitimate cultural and policy
preferences of its constituent national democracies. Primary among these are
the principles of subsidiary, European supervision, and the "margin of
appreciation" doctrine that utilizes European consensus to limit the court's
interpretive alternatives.'47 This reliance on consensus over the meaning of
rights has been a crucial component in the evolution of the Court's legitimacy
and, correspondingly, its ultimate success in enforcement.
Third, the Court's institutional practices, ranging from selection ofjudges
to litigation procedures, are far more professional and credible than those of
most other international human rights enforcement institutions. The full-time
employment of highly trained professional judges and staff, vetted by the
domestic political processes of the state parties and provided with adequate
financial resources, is fundamental to the ECHR's success. Finally, as
previously noted, the ECHR benefits enormously from social, political, and
economic linkages, which provide substantial incentives for compliance with
the court's decisions. The development of such incentives, tied to the
Between the EU and Its Member States-A Textual Analysis, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 993
(2004).
' See, e.g., Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991) (transsexualism); B.
v. France, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1993) (transsexualism); X v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 143, 169 (1997) (state refusal to register transsexual as father of child conceived through
artificial insemination); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981)
(homosexual sodomy); Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1,6-17, 19-21 (1997)
(upholding government refusal to license video based on blasphemous content).
47 See generally Donoho, supra note 22, at 450-66.
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decisions of reformed international institutions focused on universally
understood rights, may prove crucial to the eventual enforceability of
international rights generally.
IV. THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
Both the success of the ECHR and developing enforcement alternatives
described above potentially have two significant implications for the future of
human rights enforcement. First, these developments have some potential for
creating effective alternatives to more traditional approaches to enforcement.
As noted below, however, there are certain problematic aspects to these
alternatives that may limit their potential usefulness in this regard. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, these developing alternatives may provide
critical insights regarding how to remedy critical weaknesses in existing
approaches and institutions.
A. Providing Effective Enforcement Alternatives
How might the enforcement alternatives described above directly advance
the effectiveness of human rights? In the first instance, all three alternatives
have some potential for enhancing deterrence against violations of
international standards. Traditional enforcement techniques, aimed almost
exclusively at governments, currently provide limited deterrence against
human rights violations. It is true, of course, that the dearth of realistic
practical incentives and consequences for governments is central to this lack
of effective deterrence and must ultimately be addressed. 4 8 However, it seems
equally rational to believe that an increased focus on individual accountability
should improve deterrence by creating significant personal disincentives for
individual perpetrators of abuse. Although currently only a potential, an
optimist could easily envision a network of states utilizing universal
jurisdiction to provide criminal and civil remedies in a fashion that denies
"safe haven" to individual human rights violators.'49 An important first step
148 See supra notes 81, 85-88, 145-47 and accompanying text.
149 This is a common theme of those who advocate use of transnational litigation. See, e.g.,
Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable
by Using International Law in US. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complimentary Strategies,
19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 169, 177-79 (2005).
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in preventing violations is eliminating the perception of individual impunity
generated by current conditions.
This focus on individual accountability also tends to circumvent the paucity
of government incentives to effectively enforce international standards against
other governments. Both the Filartiga- and Pinochet-style remedies are
dependent to some degree on the political will of the host forum, which must,
in the first instance, generally authorize such remedies.15 However, if
appropriately limited to avoid overt political abuse and conflicts with national
foreign policy, neither remedy should depend directly on case-by-case
government-bound motivations, which are inevitably linked to competing
policy and political interests. Once such actions are authorized by domestic
law, particular cases are at least partly isolated from competing national
interests. This, and increased victim access and control over remedies, should
lessen the potential for political manipulations-a problem that has often
plagued the work of international human rights bodies.'
Finally, although in distinct ways, each of these developing enforcement
alternatives avoids some of the institutional weaknesses reflected in the
traditional mechanisms for enforcement.'52 Domestic institutions utilized
under the Filartiga and Pinochet paradigms will usually enjoy well-established
authority and effective means for effectuating their decisions. Domestic
courts, for example, are more likely to be staffed by independent, professional
judges and their jurisdiction defined and controlled by legislation. Also
subject to a degree of public accountability, such institutions enjoy the
attributes of legitimacy and credibility currently lacking in most existing
international forums.153
150 The host forum legal system must authorize or approve such remedies, typically through
legislative or judicial action. Similarly, criminal prosecutions such as those in Pinochet will
typically depend on discretionary judgments made by government prosecutors or judges. See,
e.g., supra notes 95-101, 104 and accompanying text.
.5 See supra note 47.
152 International institutions currently have many built-in limitations on their enforcement
capacity, some of which are inherent. See supra notes 43-55, 61-64, 75-78 and accompanying
text. Reliance on well-established and respected domestic institutions with regularized
enforcement capacity helps avoid some of these limitations.
153 There is, however, at least one sense in which foreign domestic institutions will lack an
important component of legitimacy. Decisions rendered by foreign domestic processes regarding
extraterritorial events possess neither intrinsic connections nor elements of local accountability
to the people and culture of the place where the relevant violations occurred. See supra notes
101, 103 and accompanying text. This lack of "connectivity" makes it critical that such foreign
or extrinsic remedies focus on the narrow range of rights that enjoy universal acceptance and
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It is easy, however, to overstate the potential enforcement value of these
alternatives. The options described above are, at least for now, not sufficiently
widespread or accepted to make significant advances towards alleviating
human rights abuses. 54 Put into perspective, it is difficult to view the limited
number of civil judgments against foreign defendants brought before U.S.
courts as anything other than symbolic.' Similarly, the reality is that there
have been no successful domestic criminal prosecutions following the
Pinochet model, and Belgium's recent experiment with full-scale adoption of
universal jurisdiction has revealed problematic implications and distinct
practical limitations on its use." 6
There also appears to be significant limits on the potential effectiveness of
international criminal processes. The number of actual defendants that will
appear before such tribunals, if the ICTY's experiences hold true, will be quite
limited. Like the ad hoc tribunals before it, the ICC will undoubtedly have
difficulty apprehending future defendants, and the subsidiary role of the ICC
clear definitions susceptible to culturally neutral applications. See also Donoho, supra note 22,
at 450-66.
114 Evidence about the potential spread of Filartiga-style civil remedies to countries outside
of the United States is somewhat murky. There is at least some evidence that similar remedies
are increasingly available in Europe in the form of reparations relating to criminal charges for
extraterritorial human rights violations. See Van Schaack, supra note 92, at 144-47.
155 While many claims have been brought under the ATCA and TVPA, see Stephens, supra
note 18, only a modest number have resulted in judgments, mostly through default. See Coliver
et al., supra note 149, at 176 (citing sixteen cases resulting in judgments); Stephens, supra note
116, at 533, 534 (noting that "interest [in ATCA] far outstrips the actual results of the litigation:
most ATS cases have been dismissed, only about two dozen cases have produced final judgments
under the statute, and only one judgment has led to the collection of significant damages"); see
also Van Schaack, supra note 92, at 170. The requirements ofjurisdiction essentially ensure that
only a limited number of defendants-those who travel to the United States-will ever be
brought to justice before U.S. courts. But see Coliver et al., supra note 149, at 175 (reporting
that the Center for Justice and Accountability estimates that "several hundred" potential
defendants currently reside in the United States). Similarly, the potential for victims to ever in
fact receive compensation is probably limited in that most defendants do not have significant
assets or are able to hide their assets. See, e.g., George Norris Stavis, Note, Collecting
Judgments in Human Rights Torts Cases-Flexibility for Non-Profit Litigators?, 31 COLUM.
HuM. RTs L. REV. 209, 214-16 (1999); Coliver et al., supra note 149, at 179 (addressing the
difficulty of reaching defendants' assets). Whether such suits provide any realistic deterrence
against human rights violations remains correspondingly uncertain. However, as many have
pointed out, symbolism and intangible benefits to those limited number of victims who find their
way to U.S. courts have real value if for no other reason than preventing the United States from
becoming a safe haven for human rights abusers. Id. at 175-86.
156 See Steven R. Ratner, Comment, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 888, 891-94 (2003); Vandermeersch, supra note 105, at 404-09.
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will limit its prosecutions to those where political conditions become favorable
and domestic alternatives are impossible.'57
Yet, despite these limits and other potential downsides, these developing
alternatives should be lauded as potentially useful tools for enforcing human
rights. Each has, in essence, opened new frontiers in the quest for
accountability. Their importance does not lie in their current effectiveness, but
rather in their potential. The Filartiga and Pinochet approaches create
potentially vibrant enforcement precedents by opening neutral domestic courts
to victims of human rights violations occurring in places where local domestic
redress is implausible or ineffective. Widespread adoption of such remedies
grounded in appropriately limited universal jurisdiction, especially among
Western industrialized democracies where former human rights abusers are
most likely to hide, would undoubtedly increase the potential that human rights
victims will have access to neutral and effective judicial redress.
B. Insights for Reform: Defining Appropriate Roles for International
Institutions
What lessons for improving existing institutional frameworks may be drawn
from the enforcement alternatives and the successes of the ECHR described
above? Initially, it should be recognized that effective international human
rights institutions are critical to world-wide realization of human rights.
Enforcement of human rights is ideally the job of domestic institutions where
alleged violations occur. We live, however, in a less than ideal world, where
effective domestic protection of individual rights will continue to be often
impossible. In our imperfect world, international human rights bodies must
and should play a vital role in enforcing rights and providing redress.158
The central characteristics of the enforcement alternatives described above
provide insights into how a remodeled international system might more
effectively fulfill these functions. First and most importantly, the international
community should make critical distinctions among rights with regard to
enforceability. Enforcement mechanisms regarding well-defined, universally
accepted rights for which international consensus over meaning exists will be
more palatable and more readily accepted by governments. This is true not
157 See generally Goldsmith, supra note 135.
,5 These international institutions also serve many valuable roles apart from enforcement.
The work of promoting rights awareness, exposing violations, and responding to human rights
crises is vital, and in critical ways, distinct from the work of authoritative enforcement.
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only for accused governments, but also for the international community
generally, whose cooperation in creating meaningful incentives for compliance
is vital. Mandatory sanctions through recourse to the U.N. Security Council,
or economic incentives linked to the WTO or IMF are, for example, far more
likely to be accepted if limited to violations of universally understood and
accepted rights.
Similarly, this more nuanced approach to the enforceability of different
categories of rights, if coupled with other institutional reforms, would
significantly enhance the perceived legitimacy of international human rights
institutions. Attempts to authoritatively interpret and enforce specific
applications of human rights that are subject to genuine cultural and political
dispute inevitably raise concerns about overreaching, lack of accountability,
and usurpation of local choice. By focusing enforcement efforts (as opposed
to non-binding promotional activity) on universally understood and relatively
uncontroversial rights, concerns over institutional legitimacy are greatly
ameliorated.
Such distinctions among rights also lend themselves to important
institutional reforms that could prompt governments to accept more
authoritative enforcement mandates. For example, the newly created ICC has
enormous potential for engendering state respect for its authority that is
typically missing from existing international human rights institutions. Unlike
most existing institutions, the ICC has been created with a clearly defined and
circumscribed mandate and relatively narrow subject matter focus. Fears of
overreaching or politicized decision-making should be generally alleviated by
the subsidiary nature of the court's jurisdiction. While the ICC's ultimate
legitimacy and credibility will depend in part on whether it earns the respect
of states incrementally over time, it is legally well situated to accomplish that
goal. The jurisdiction and mandate of existing institutions should be amended
and clarified, or new institutions created, to reflect such distinctions.
Such distinctions and limits on jurisdictional mandate will not only greatly
improve the perceived legitimacy of human rights institutions, they may help
mediate the inherent tension between authoritative international enforcement
and domestic democratic prerogatives. I have argued elsewhere that the
preservation of democratic values and our concerns over the democratic
legitimacy of human rights decision-making should shape how the
international community approaches enforcement, particularly regarding the
authority of international institutions.'59 Indeed, in a perfect world populated
' Donoho, supra note 10.
[Vol. 35:1
HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
by functioning democratic states with reasonable domestic institutional
safeguards, authoritative international remedies might reasonably be seen as
inappropriate or counterproductive to democratic ideals. 6 '
A key consideration in this regard once again involves jurisdictional
constraint and distinctions among rights. Enforcement focused on
international consensus, universal jurisdiction, andjus cogens, for example,
sharply reduces concerns over the democratic authenticity and accountability
of international decision-making. Violations subject to universal jurisdiction,
like those that justify the prosecution of war crimes by the ICC, are not
"foreign" or "external" to the world's domestic legal systems and societies.
Rather, parallel legal norms exist within virtually all domestic legal systems
and are deeply interwoven into the cultural and social fabric of every society.
A new name for an old wrong like "ethnic cleansing" does not imply that the
Bosnian Serbs had a different moral or legal code on that subject before
international standards were developed by the ICTY. The traditional norms
and morals of virtually all societies, including Serbia, were violated by the
atrocities committed in Bosnia.
The creation of new or revised enforcement mandates, limited to rights over
which true international consensus exists, should be coupled with other
institutional reforms designed to promote credibility and respect. Models for
such institutional reforms should include the ECHR and ICC. Although
imperfect, both institutions possess generally credible and neutral procedures
for selecting judges or "experts," professional and regularized rules of
evidence and procedures, and plausibly sufficient staffs and budgets.
Finally, the reforms described above must be accompanied by efforts to link
resulting international decisions to practical economic and political
consequences that create practical incentives for voluntary compliance. Such
incentives, crucial to the success of the ECHR, are only likely to develop,
160 Id. at 56-64. It must be acknowledged that the developing enforcement alternatives
described above, if used without constraint, are not entirely consistent with this outlook. For
example, the most troubling objections to the Pinochet case have centered on the policy
implications that arise when foreign courts indict former heads of states or other public officials,
particularly when the originating jurisdiction has granted amnesties or is attempting other forms
of national reconciliation. Foreign litigation and prosecutions under these circumstances have
the potential to usurp the originating state's domestic processes and prerogatives. This potential
for external interference with domestic democratic choice is similar to that created by
authoritative international decision-making. In this sense, the Pinochet and Filartiga paradigms
create variants on the inherent tension between international and domestic authority. Thus, these
enforcement paradigms create new and distinct accountability issues since each involves
decision-makers external to the people, culture, and context in which the violations took place.
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however, with regard to decisions limited to enforcement of a fairly narrow
range of universal rights over which true concerns exists.
V. CONCLUSION
Enforcement remains the weakest component of the international human
rights system. Designed around the implausible premise of voluntary state
compliance, existing international institutions outside of Europe currently lack
the capacity to meaningfully enforce human rights in a world characterized by
conflict and diversity. Already hobbled by institutional weaknesses, existing
human rights bodies have failed to develop incrementally their legitimacy and
earn the respect of governments by developing a nuanced approach to
enforcement that recognizes distinctions among rights regarding enforceability.
Lessons for reform should be drawn in this regard from the ECHR and
developing enforcement alternatives that focus on individual accountability for
a fairly narrow range of rights over which international consensus exists.
